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The Problem of Identity in Selected
Early Essays of James Baldwin
James Baldwin’s major non-fictional works, including the ten essays
comprising Notes ofa Native Son (1955), show an increasing and painful
awareness of the problems inherent in the quest for personal and artistic
identity. The crises in Baldwin’s life, most often communicated in his
works as artistic, religious, and sexual, have given rise to a single-minded
dedication to the search for discovery of the self, even to the present day
with his recent return to America. Perceiving that one’s identity must be
created in one’s experience, Baldwin continually demonstrates his
knowledge of the triple burden of Black, artist, and bisexual in an
American cultural environment inimical to each, and thereby informs his
writing with an irony that intensifies his search. Each of his major works
at bottom attests to the quest for identity which most Baldwin critics
either have ignored, in the attempt to place him in the stream of Black
protest literature, on the one hand, or minimized, on the other hand,
because of their antagonism toward the duality which they find associated
with the identity search.
Robert Bone was one of the first to point out the twin emotions of
shame and rage in Baldwin’s works, and to note that: “The flight from
self, the quest for identity, and the sophisticated acceptance of one’s
‘blackness’ are the themes that flow from this emotion.”1 Several Black
scholars and other students of contemporary Black literature have
pointed to a duality in Baldwin’s work. Stephen Spender2 and Edward
Margolies3 are chief among these critics who see that the quest for public
acclaim and personal selfhood obscures Baldwin’s search for artistic
identity. These critics speak of a split between Baldwin the artist and
Baldwin the propagandist—the transmitter of social messages and object
lessons. Other critics like George Kent,4 Howard N. Harper, Jr.,5 Calvin
C. Hernton,6 and Charles Newman7 see as significant the unmistakably
strong influence on Baldwin’s work of certain French existentialists
whose vision of the human condition and how to deal with it transcends
the traditional literary/sociological categories of artist and propagandist.
Still others like Harper, Granville Hicks,8 Julian Mayfield,9 and Mike
Thelwell10 insist correctly, I believe, that Baldwin’s “is not the strident
voice of a flaming radical [but] ... an eloquent plea from a native artist
seriously concerned with the fate of [his] country.”11 Further, he is seen
by this group of critics as a writer concerned with defining “the nature of
the writer’s responsibility”12 and “the functions and the problems of the
name of letters in contemporary society.”13 This approach, taken by too
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few critics since the period following the publication of Nobody Knows
My Name (1961), has been followed by those who perceive Baldwin’s
work primarily as an engagement of inner self with outer world.
Mayfield, elsewhere a harsh critic of Baldwin’s fiction, writes
persuasively in the New Republic review of Nobody Knows My Name that
Baldwin is “a man possessed by the necessity of coming to grips with
himself and his country,”14 a possession which suggests a seeking after
wholeness rather than the duality or split asserted by critics. According to
Baldwin in his most recent collection of serious essays, No Name in the
Street, his primary aim is, and always has been, “to achieve ... a viable,
organic connection between [his] public stance and [his] private life,”15
an aim which he claims has eluded most Americans. The attempted
integration of the self, then, is the characteristic, pervasive, and crucial
act resisting at every turn efforts to polarize Baldwin.
With respect to the emphasis of this paper, the essays will serve as focal
points through which are refracted the issues about which Baldwin writes,
and his treatment of seemingly disparate views of the human condition.
Any attempt to study Baldwin’s early essays in the terms already defined
must concentrate on establishing certain identity patterns or themes
which are introduced in the earliest and recur throughout the collected
works. Likewise, undergirding and uniting these emphases is the belief
that James Baldwin has been, is now, and will continue to be intent,
above all, on communicating artistically his felt perception of himself, his
culture, and his fellow human beings. It will be shown that Baldwin’s
“self” is emerging and ever-changing, and that he is, at the present
moment, “making himself up.”
The earliest essays in Notes ofa Native Son seem to provide the form
and style in which questions of identity are best discussed. The style of
these essays is obviously more self-revelatory, more intensely personal,
than that of the novels. In choosing the nonfictional form as his major
genre of expression, Baldwin writes and reveals himself at the same time,
thus meeting at once his artistic and therapeutic needs. As a result, the
essays are not academic, since he cannot, as an artist or a Black man,
afford the luxury of engaging in mere academic, impersonal exercise. I
believe that Colin Maclnnes’ assessment of the strength of Baldwin’s
essay voice is correct: “ . . . because I see—or hear—James Baldwin as a
voice, a presence, a singer almost, that I feel the mode of direct
address—to us in his own person, and not through invented ‘charac¬
ters’—expresses his talent and his message best.”16 For Baldwin, then,
the essays are a “working out” of his identity crisis in ways that are
unavailable to him in the novels.
Baldwin’s earliest expressed desire to be an honest man and a good
writer17 is, in David Levin’s view, “the central metaphor through which to
express, in his autobiographical writings, his spiritual quest and his
evangelical plea to our society.”18 In these terms, Baldwin’s journey has
led down two roads simultaneously—the personal and the public.
Likewise, Harper amplifies Levin’s view in referring to the “dual
personality” that Baldwin has become; he is, explains Harper,
THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY 3
. . . both a fiery prophet of the racial apocalypse and a sensitive explorer of man’s
inmost nature. In his role as Negro spokesman he has been forced into an activism in
which he does not deeply believe. In his role as artist he is concerned with a problem
more basic, more complex, and perhaps even more urgent than the problem of civil
rights, a problem of which civil rights is only a part.19
Levin and Harper offer a promising perspective which I shall explore by a
detailed examination of the personal-artistic quest as treated in Baldwin’s
autobiographical essays in the first volume.
What is striking about Baldwin’s essays is the pervasiveness of
considerable personal experience in a literary genre that generally is
impersonal. Newman argues convincingly that Baldwin, like his stylistic
mentor Henry James, “has used the essay not as exposition in lieu of a
work of larger intent, but as a testing ground for his fiction.”20 The first
essays are concerned with identity and may be seen to establish the
direction in which all of Baldwin’s subsequent essays point. Stated
broadly, the essays are grouped thematically under questions of artistic,
personal, and national identity. In each group. Baldwin is half Negro, half
American, an incomplete fusion. The very pre-supposition of human
identity—the autobiographical “I” which he establishes and with which
he speaks—often is ironically called into question by the overwhelming
inhumanity or dehumanization pervading and dominating the American
cultural environment. Considered from the triple perspective, then, each
essay emphasizes some aspect of the Black man’s struggle for identity and
analyzes the misconceptions and hatreds separating the Black and White
races. Most of these essays in some way record the difficulties not only in
recognizing, understanding, or accepting one’s identity, but more
crucially, in being. In a sense, the essays are therapeutic vehicles for
Baldwin, by which he can work through to his own concept of himself.
The essays of Part One in which Baldwin carefully examines the role of
the literary artist and his own relationship to art as a Black man reveal
some of these difficulties. If the two important essays in this section,
“Everybody’s Protest Novel” and “Many Thousands Gone”—widely
and, surprisingly, misinterpreted—are measured in relation to Baldwin’s
clearly-stated assumption in the “Autobiographical Notes,” then it
becomes apparent that he did, very early in his literary career, lay out for
himself a psycho-ideological construct on which he has been building ever
since. This construct or pattern encompasses all the identity elements
outlined by Erik Erikson and Abraham Maslow.21
Simply stated, the “Autobiographical Notes” is Baldwin’s Credo; the
two “artistic” essays are his Apologia. In the initial piece, he establishes
his identity first as a human being, born in Harlem, and, in the second
sentence, as a writer. The order to identity here is very important, for
Baldwin seems to insist in this Credo on being confronted as an artist, on
artistic terms. He claims as paramount the relationship between the
experience of one’s life and one’s creation of art. In much the same way
that Ralph Ellison articulates his artistic vision,22 Baldwin announces:
One writes out of one thing only—one’s own experiences. Everything depends on how
relentlessly one forces from this experience the last drop, sweet or bitter, it can possibly
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give. This is the only realconcern ofthe artist, to recreate out of the disorder of life that
order which is art.23
About the meaning of Baldwin’s vision there should be no confusion. He
determines to examine closely his own experience through his art.
Furthermore, he is forthright in his statements regarding himself as a
Black artist. This Black artist, he explains, believes as do some other
artists—Black and White—that
. . . social affairs are not generally speaking the writer’s concern, whether they ought
to be or not; it is absolutely necessary that he establish between himself and these
affairs a distance which will allow, at least, for clarity, so that before he can look
forward in any meaningful sense, he must first be allowed to take a long look back.24
Baldwin nowhere attempts in this essay to ignore his Blackness.
Certainly he does reveal a certain ambivalence regarding his relationship
as Negro man to the stream of Western culture,25 but at the same time he
gives credence to and affirms the “sweet and bitter” influences that have
shaped his life and art—Dickens, Stowe, Mather, Mayor LaGuardia, his
father, storefront churches, a Saxton Fellowship, Richard Wright, the
King James Bible. Neither does he base his artistic motivation upon the
desire, as Irving Howe claims,26 to escape his Blackness. Rather, he
resembles the existentialist Outsider in wanting to transcend or obliterate
any and all structures, constructs, categories, whether these are imposed
on his art by White men or set up, defensively, by Blacks.27 Although
Baldwin’s professed hatred and fear of the world includes Black people,
this confession that “he despised them, possibly because they failed to
produce Rembrandt”28 cannot, must not be construed as blanket ethnic
self-hatred. In the context of the “Autobiographical Notes,” it is a painful
admission of a limitation and an inability, thus far, fully to affirm the self
or to accept his Being. This admitted hatred of Black men is now an
avowal; the statement, coming as it does at the beginning of Baldwin’s
journey, is a tentative point on the continuum, a position that, as Lerone
Bennett contends, could easily be taken by “any Negro who has not
emancipated himself, as Baldwin was doing.”29 The implication is that
once the Black searcher is emancipated, the position no longer is
defensible or necessary.
Evidently, Baldwin wishes to reduce the importance of his Negroness,
not because of the shame which he certainly has been forced to feel but
rather because in maximizing the essential fact, he is that much further
removed from his perceived identity as human being and artist. Perhaps
he sees that being a Black man in America tends to prevent the
achievement of “that psychological and emotional distance necessary to
artistic creation.”30 Or perhaps he wants to work through it to his own
concept of Black artist. Erikson suggests that, in their growing awareness
of the relation of positive and negative identity elements, Black writers
like Baldwin and Ellison question seriously the possibility of the usable
past or the present cultural environment to overcome the negative image
imposed on Black men. As creative individuals, these writers “must
accept the negative identity as the very base line of recovery. . . . But
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[they] continue to write and write strongly for [literature] even in
acknowledging the depth of nothingness can contribute to something akin
to a collective recovery.”31
Baldwin announces early in his career, “I am speaking as a writer.”32
He has “chosen” to become an artist. His vehicles for self-actualization
are the essay and the novel, not the sociological polemic or the
psychological study or the political platform. This distinction is made
clearly in the “Autobiographical Notes”; once made, transition from
Credo to Apologia is natural and inevitable.
Only after defining his Being in terms of a general artistic vision
doesBaldwin begin to examine the deeper questions inherent in a Black
vision of art. This “progression” of thought from the “Autobiographical
Notes” to the two essays on Black art is crucial to any objective
assessment of James Baldwin’s identity quest. What Howe and others
find so unconscionable in Baldwin’s rejection of Black protest literature
championed by Wright’s school is precisely what I find so just and
necessary in the maintenance of his particular artistic vision.
Novel” and “Many Thousands Gone” are: What do I wish to make of
myself? and what do I have to work with?33 What can I be? What is my
particular mission as a Black writer? How does my mission differ from
that of Black writers who have preceded me? Since I am a Black man with
Black experiences gained in a Black/White world, what values emanating
from my experience can I affirm in my art? Which ones must I negate or
reject? In light of these burning issues, it should be apparent that
Baldwin’s revolt against Wright and the protest school is as much the
result of his emerging personal vision of Black aesthetic identity as it is a
repudiation of the literature produced by this school.
Baldwin’s primary objection to protest literature is that it confines the
Black man within his own skin. Whereas the aim of the American protest
novel is “to bring greater freedom to the oppressed,”34 Baldwin finds that
the aim fails because such novels reject human Being and human life,
deny its beauty, and insist on an existence for their heroes that is
impossible for them to transcend.35 The “novels of Negro oppression,”
written by Blacks and Whites alike, fail furthermore because they ignore
the fact that oppressor and oppressed are bound inextricably in American
culture.36 This linking together in cultural reality, for which Baldwin
employs the metaphor of a cage, ora lead simultaneously to the discovery
of identity for the oppressed and a recognition, by the oppressor, of the
Black man’s humanity. However, in Baldwin’s view, the cage of reality of
the American cultural environment is locked more securely with each
appearance of that kind of novel which articulates an essentially
naturalistic, behavioristic, sometimes Marxian, vision of men like Uncle
Tom and Bigger Thomas. That the Black man is merely or only the
product of his socio-political predicament, that literary art should seek to
publish this news, is anathematic to James Baldwin.
In short, Baldwin argues in “Everybody’s Protest Novel” that the
American novel should have properly little to do with social experience
per se. On the contrary, it has much to do with
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. . . something resolutely indefinable, unpredictable. In overlooking, denying, evading
this complexity—which is nothing more than the disquieting complexity of
ourselves—we are diminished and we perish; only within this web of ambiguity,
paradox, this hunger, darkness, danger, can we find at once ourselves and the power
that will free us from ourselves. It is thispower ofrevelation which is the business ofthe
novelist, this journey toward a more vast reality which must take precedence over all
other claims.37
As in the “Autobiographical Notes,” so Baldwin repeats here the
burden of Black humanity in America, which he knows cannot be ignored
or escaped. So also does he fix his concern, irrevocably, with Black and
White humanity which encompasses the complexities of human
experience. In the context of this essay, moreover, Baldwin admits the
difficulties but states emphatically that the burden of the past must be
accepted nonetheless.38 Certainly, if his Credo is to be considered as a
statement of artistic belief and artistic intent, then the subsequent
rejection of the traditional protest genre is consistent.39 The Truth he
seeks lies elsewhere, to be uncovered and proclaimed. One begins to
suspect that the content and referrent of Baldwin’s emerging vision of
Truth is moral rather than social.
Those portions of “Many Thousands Gone” dealing with his conscious
revolt against protest literature are extensions of the thought presented in
“Everybody’s Protest Novel,” which is antedated by two years. The
charges herein are far more explicit; Baldwin has become more confident
in the rightness of his own vision and in his ability to refuse the mantle of
Wright’s tutelage. The essay, then, defines more fully than “Everybody’s
Protest Novel,” Baldwin’s position, in contradiction to Wright’s. What is
new—though perhaps not so much new as more carefully tho ght
through, more forthrightly articulated—is his relating of Notesofa Native
Son to the traditional depiction in American fiction of “an unremarkable
youth in battle with the force of circumstance. . . . In this case the force of
circumstance which cannot be overcome, . . . ”40 Noting that Bigger
Thomas is only <?/z<?part of an infinitely more complex reality than Wright
is willing, or able, to perceive, Baldwin points to a fundamental
deficiency in Wright’s vision:
What is missing in Bigger’s situation and in the representation of his psycholo¬
gy—which makes his situation false and his psychology incapable to development—is
any revelatory apprehension of Bigger as one of the Negro’s realities or as one of the
Negro’s roles. This failure is part of the previously noted failure to convey any sense of
Negro life as a continuing and complex group reality.41
So Baldwin finds both Bigger Thomas and his novel trapped, not in the
cage of reality, but in a distorted American image of Black life of which
the question of Blacks’ basic humanity, the depth of their relationships to
each other, and their complex relationships to White Americans, is moot
or not even perceived.42
A further contention that Baldwin presents in this essay is particularly
germane to the problem of identity. Using Wright and Bigger as a
framework—again for purposes of contradiction—Baldwin distinguishes
between his life as a human being and his life as a Black man. The one, he
believes, is his real life; the other a social and mythical life, imposed or
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projected. There is always a conflict between the two lives, Baldwin
insists, but while the conflict never can be resolved, one must make
perpetually that “paradoxical adjustment . . . [to] the dark and
dangerous and unloved stranger [that] is part of himself forever.”43 In
other words, one has not only to recognize but also accept “his private
Bigger Thomas living in the skull, . . . ”44 Unless this is done, no Black
man can begin to be free. By making these distinctions, Baldwin further
defines his identity and distances himself from Wright whose naturalistic
assumptions do not lead toward the same goal, artistically, that Baldwin
has begun to seek. Exactly what workable formulas will serve him best are
not yet apparent to him; what is clear at this juncture, however, is that
Baldwin’s conception of the relationship between one’s social experience
and literary art is markedly different from his mentor’s. If Wright’s failure
as an artist was indeed the failure to examine the roots of the “gratuitous
and compulsive” violence with which he suffused his work, then Baldwin
has already determined to avoid failing in that way.
Judging the content and emphases of the essays in Part One of Notes of
a Native Son, we note Baldwin’s resolute determination to share in the
panorama of common humanity through his art. He does not yet go as far
as Ellison’s “willed affirmation” of his Being,45 but he does show signs in
these first essays of engaging the question of human-ness (humanity). His
is an inclusive vision of human beings and of literary art, excluding
nothing which would bear on the spectrum of humanity. The ambivalent
attitudes that Baldwin holds—Black protest literature versus personal
art, Black versus White—seem to form some kind of motif of tension or
conflict. It is necessary to establish this tensional pattern in the other
essays and to determine what significance it has for James Baldwin’s total
identity quest.
Those essays of Part Two in which Baldwin exposes his youth further
illustrate, in an intensely painful fashion, his difficulties in recognizing,
understanding, and accepting his own identity. Although written in a
language more subjective than the essays on artistic identity, they
reinforce nonetheless the growing impression that Baldwin’s pilgrimage
is directed consciously toward every aspect of his Being. These essays
reveal what Newman calls Baldwin’s obsession with dualities and
paradox.46 “The Harlem Ghetto” establishes in fairly objective,
dispassionate terms, the Black world into which the title piece, “Notes of
a Native Son,” shows Baldwin to have been born. This world assures that
Negro boys and girls “by the age of puberty, [are] irreparably scarred by
the conditions of . . . life. All over Harlem, they [are] growing into
stunted maturity, trying desperately to find a place to stand . . . ”47
Existence in the explosive Harlem ghetto is marked by an aura of waiting,
of bitter expectancy which never achieves positive or meaningful fruition
for its young.48 Baldwin introduces the motif of waiting—for tenement
repairs, for better jobs, for welfare payments, for death—in terms of the
familiar metaphor of Winter,49 noting the stoic resignation of older, tired
Blacks that “it is coming and it will be hard; there is nothing anyone can
do about it.”50 But for the young who find daily identification with Jewish
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merchants and Judeo-Christian religion unavoidable and who share “a
furious, bewildered rage, the rage of people who cannot find solid ground
beneath their feet,”51 the bitter resignation often is transformed into self-
or other-directed destruction.
In “The Harlem Ghetto,” Baldwin is unequivocal in stating his
convictions regarding the totally negative results on Black lives of the
oppressive cultural environment, touching at points the same nerve that
the psychologists and social scientists touch. He explains:
I am not one of the people who believe that oppression imbues people with wisdom or
insight or sweet charity, though the survival of the Negro in this country would simply
not have been all he felt. . . . the wonder is not that so many are ruined but that so many
survive. The Negro’s outlets are desperately constructed. In his dilemma he turns first
upon himself and then upon whatever most represents to him his own emasculation.52
Similarly in “Many Thousands Gone” which deals as much with the Black
man’s human identity as it does with the artistic limitations of this
humanity in Wright, Baldwin analyzes the predicament in strikingly
psychosocial terms. Employing the first person plural to fix his shared
humanity in American culture—in which the Black American also is part
of the national “we”—Baldwin details the problem in the following
passages:
The ways in which the Negro has affected the American psychology are betrayed in our
popular culture and in our morality; in our estrangement from him in the depth of our
estrangement from ourselves.53
Introducing imagery of light-shadow-darkness which is developed early
and recurs in clusters throughout the essay, he sees
The Negro in America, gloomingly referred to as that shadow which lies athwart our
national life, who is far more than that. He is a series of shadows, self-created,
intertwining, which now we helplessly battle. One may say that the Negro in America
does not really exist except in the darkness of our minds.54
Baldwin’s idea of the American Black man as a series of self-created
shadows gains import when we consider his own personal identity search
as Black man and artist in terms of creating and “remaking” the self.55
Again, Baldwin insists on placing the problem in its human contexts when
he observes the Blacks’ dehumanization at the hands of American
Whites, or, finally,
The American image of the Negro which lives also in the Negro’s heart; and when he
has surrendered to this image life has no other possible reality. Then he, like the white
enemy with whom he will be locked one day in mortal struggle, has no means save this
of asserting his identity.56
It would seem from these quotations that James Baldwin claims that the
Negro is like everyone else in America. This charge is levelled, wrongly I
believe, by several critics, including Dachine Rainer and Marcus Klein.57
If it is so, then the claim denies Baldwin’s Negroness as a personal reality.
It appears, however, that instead of psychologically repudiating his
Blackness in this essay, he rather affirmshis own existential condition and
that of his Black fellows. The problems of Black identity for Baldwin go
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far beyond the facile matter of one’s nationality; they concern deeply the
collective Black impression of alienation from the human condition.
Several of Baldwin’s recurrent themes are introduced in this essay,
including the negative influence of the Black man’s past in America, the
dehumanizing effects of an oppressive culture, and the loss of and search
for identity by the Black and White American alike. Baldwin views
identity in the earliest essays as something to be achieved, created, or
shaped, but the initial, positive statement in “Autobiographical Notes”
of his own identity recognition #/zz/acceptance of himself as Black man,“a
kind of bastard of the West,”58 is both explicit and crucial. This
realization is expressed in the same kind of language used by DuBois, J.
Saunders Redding,59 and Malcolm X. Although, he admits, “the most
difficult (and most rewarding) thing in my life has been the fact that I was
born a Negro and forced, therefore, to effect some kind of truce with this
reality,”60 nevertheless he affirms his Black being within the context of
the fabric of American culture. Thus, the factoi his Blackness precedes
all other considerations of human or American identity; this fact even
relegates to secondary and even tertiary position what Newman calls
Baldwin’s “love-hate affair with religion, sex, color, America”61 in all the
essays and novels predating Another Country.
The title essay centers as much in Baldwin’s examination of the
paternal pattern and its impact upon his life as in his discovery of his
relationship as Black man first to an essentially White social environment
and second to himself. The “truce” with the reality of his Blackness is
effected in this essay in terms which both parallel and illuminate the
four-part identity-crisis event, namely, recognition, understanding or
perception, acceptance, and identification or authentic relationship.
The death of David Baldwin with which the title essay begins and
through which James Baldwin orders the entire piece, marks the
culmination of his young manhood. It has not been sufficiently noted that
the dominant motif of the essay is disease. Physical and psychic sickness
infuse the Harlem ghetto of Baldwin’s childhood and eats away the life of
David Baldwin. The relative dispassion with which Baldwin details the
effects of oppressive ghetto life in “The Harlem Ghetto” becomes in this
intensely personal and probing essay a passionate, yet ordered,
autobiographical case history. He manages to maintain throughout a
psychic distance from his father’s growing sickness—a kind of objectivity
that permits him first to describe, then to analyze, and finally to
empathize and reconcile for himself the terrors of the “dread, chronic
disease”62 that annihilates once and for all his father’s identity but has
only begun to obscure his own. However, the paternal pattern is firmly
established, by Baldwin’s own admission; this pattern provides, on the
one hand, the framework for the painful, finally rewarding probe of his
own emerging identity, and it signals the escape from this pattern on the
other.
David Baldwin, a man “locked up in his terrors,”63 was to his children
“ingrown, like a toe-nail.”64 By employing this image, Baldwin manages
to convey both the inward movement of a frustrated existence on itself
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and the potential poisoning of such an existence, for if the toe-nail is not
cut out and the poison to the bloodstream is not checked, the foot withers
and dies. A corollary of the disease imagery likewise is provided early in
Baldwin’s description of his father as “the most bitter man I have ever
met.”65 The bitterness pre-existent in the ghetto infected David Baldwin,
turning him slowly into a frightening Black figure, gripped by “an
intolerable bitterness of spirit”66 which Baldwin admits, at age nineteen,
overflowed and became his own. In much the same way that Marlow
perceives Kurtz initially as a voice, a presence,67 so Baldwin characterizes
his father in terms of a thundering voice full of rage, often issuing “bitter
warnings [out] of proudly pursed lips . . . ”68
David Baldwin was driven to remoteness from which he never
returned. Baldwin particularizes his father’s decline by extending
carefully the disease imagery from him to the cultural environment that
bred him. Ironically, he establishes the condition of bitterness and
suppressed rage in which his father lived as paradigmatic of the ghetto’s
constant condition; that condition is imposed, often unwittingly, on the
Black man by the White world. The impression of waiting, of bitter
expectancy that characterizes “The Harlem Ghetto” here is confirmed in
an ingenious extension of the disease motif: Harlem “seemed to be
infected by waiting.”69 The waiting characteristic of the ghetto prefigures
the family’s waiting at the bedside for David Baldwin’s death,
precipitated, according to Baldwin, because “the disease of his mind
allowed the disease of his body [tuberculosis] to destroy him.”70
The funeral more than the other events—even more than the Harlem
riot of 1943 that followed—provides the testing of the son’s identity in
relation to it. Sitting in the crowded church, Baldwin alternates between
dream digressions, in which he remembers his father, and analyses of the
real impact of his father upon his own life. One reminiscence is especially
significant as the only point in the entire essay that healing, or the
possibility of it, is allowed. In Baldwin’s mind, the existence of Harlem
“testified to the potency of the poison [of hatred and oppression] while
remaining silent as to the efficacy of whatever antidote, irresistibly raising
the question of whether or not an antidote was desirable.”71 But the
remembrance of a time in childhood when his father was not so cruel but
anxious to “heal” is recounted in terms of his “[soothing] my crying and
[applying] the stinging iodine.”72 Immediately following this remem¬
brance is the famous scene, briefly presented, of the son’s break from the
father’s vocation and way of life; this was, according to Baldwin, the only
time the two ever actually spoke to each other: “My father asked me
abruptly, ‘You’d rather write than preach, wouldn’t you?’ I was
astonished at his question—because it was a real question. I answered
‘Yes.’ That was all we said.”73
Toward the end of the essay, Baldwin again makes firm the connection
between Harlem’s sickness and his father’s by employing the imagery of
disease—this time in terms of amputation and gangrene. Because
“Harlem had needed something to smash. To smash something is the
ghetto’s chronic need,”74 the 1943 riots were precipitated. This assertion
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leads the reader to recall the eighteen-year-old youth in a segregated
Trenton cafeteria, driven to the point of smashing, crushing rage.75 It also
reminds one that David Baldwin did not enjoy the “luxury” of such rage;
his revolt against the conditions of his existence was almost always
self-directed and hence destructive.76 But the assertion also points
forward to Baldwin’s own conviction of the necessity of all Blacks to
make perpetual decisions, not between a disease and a cure, but rather
between two aspects of the same disease. The ingrown toe-nail of the
opening—taken then as a description of the father—now is expanded and
used as the cause of all Black misery. Gangrene is pre-existent in the
ghetto, while amputation—the cut—really is symbolic of it. It is explained
that his father died of gangrene; however, the perpetual choice is an
empty one since the “idea of going through life as a cripple is [as]
unbearable [as] the risk of swelling up slowly, in agony, with poison.77
It seems that precisely because Baldwin allows (invents, perhaps) for
himself an alternative other than the two he claims for Black men
generally, he is able to begin to order his own existence and to take the
first step in his identity-prilgrimage. In this crucial autobiographical
essay, he clearly establishes and defines his existence in opposition to his
father, but that is not to say that his own emerging identity is achieved at
the expense of the annihilation of his father’s. At one point in the essay,
Baldwin proudly associates his African heritage with his father;78 the
passage reveals, however, both the father’s and son’s ambivalence toward
the real worth of their heritage. Again, Baldwin analyzes the legacy left to
him by his father, dwelling not so much on the aspects of shame, rage, and
hatred as on the newly-interpreted meaning of his father’s “texts and
songs” which reveal to him that “nothing is ever escaped.”79 Indeed,
David Baldwin’s legacy of hatred is supplanted by the more powerful
admonition. In Baldwin’s view, the two overriding ideas, seemingly
opposed, of total acceptance and total refusal to accept any injustice of
life and men which either life or men impose on one’s life, signal not the
break with his father but rather Baldwin’s symbolic linking in
understanding between dead father and newly-born son. Unless one
doubts his concluding insistence on the folly of holding onto anything that
does not matter, there seems to be no other possible interpretation of the
words, “The dead man mattered, the new life mattered; blackness and
whiteness did not matter; . . . ”80
As has been shown, in “Notes of a Native Son” and in the other essays
in the “personal identity” group, Baldwin touches on certain aspects of
the “Negro’s real relation to the white American”;81 but the focus of the
title essay is on the relationship to his father and his own emerging
identity. Baldwin’s exploration of relationships—to himself, his father
and family, fellow Blacks, White men, Europeans abroad—continues as
central emphases throughout the volume, in the essays that are largely
personal as well as in those that are more outwardly focused. The essays
grouped under the rubric of “national identity” speak to the issue of
Baldwin’s place as Black American in the European social fabric. Two of
these, “Stranger in the Village” (1953) and “A Question of Identity”
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(1954) provide him with perspectives with which to interpret further the
American racial problem in terms of identity. In the first of these two
essays, Baldwin demonstrates his ability to move from the personal
situation—the fact of his being a visitor in a small Swiss village—to the
universal condition of men. The “small” experience of innocent racism in
this foreign Catholic village serves as the base on which Baldwin erects a
large, sturdy, pyramidal structure; thematically, one point of the inverted
pyramid is the rage of the “disesteemed” around the world, and the other
is the search for and maintenance of one’s own identity, once discovered.
Baldwin’s first visit to the tiny village of Loeche-les-Bains was in the
Fall of 1951, after he “had run away from his native land to escape not
only the Negro condition, but the condition of being Negro.”82 Here he
had completed Go Tell It on the Mountain; then he returned in 1953,
broke, starving, and feeling himself to be on the verge of a breakdown.
He completed “Stranger in the Village” in virtual isolation and
depressive melancholy. In spite of his former residence, he still was
regarded as an oddity, a non-person; he was the first and only Black man
that most of these natives had seen. Thus, Baldwin early in the essay
establishes his identity as a stranger in relation to the inhabitants of the
“white wilderness,” alienated from them because of his color in a way
that no other foreign stranger could be. The remote alpine village, then, is
paradigmatic of the White West “onto which,” Baldwin says, “I have
been so strangely grafted.”83 Employing a strategic pose of self-examina¬
tion, the Black “bastard of the West” distances himself, as Black man,
from the glories of Chartres, Shakespeare, Rembrandt, and the Empire
State Building, all of which—for purposes for Baldwin’s dialectic
here—he neither feels nor wants to share any part of.84 His presence in
the village also illuminates for him the meaning of the BlackAVhite
situation in his native land.
Baldwin’s conclusion in “A Question of Identity” that only from the
Europe of present reality can the American discover his own country and
thereby his identity signals the end of his alienation from himself. In
talking with Harold Isaacs in 1959 concerning his emerging convictions
regarding national identity, he insisted that the protracted and painful
process brought him anew to the old conclusion: You have to go far away
to find out that you never do get far away. ... I couldn’t get to know
France. The key to my experience was here, in America. Everything I
could deal with was here.”85 The terms with which Baldwin expresses this
insight are reminiscent of the Biblical admonition that one must lose his
life in order to find it.86 Inherent in his first expatriate experience was the
necessity almost simultaneously of losing and finding his own identity.
What became ineluctably clear to him, as the result of European exile,
was the unalterable fact of his Negro-ness and his Americanness. More
important, acceptance of both these identities formed the basis for his
next collection of essays, Nobody Knows My Name.
Thus, an examination of the content, style, and preoccupations of the
essays in Notes of a Native Son establishes the direction in which the
young essayist is moving, at the same time at which it reveals Baldwin’s
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continuing journey or pilgrimage. The continual “process of rejection
and negation” that Theodore Gross sees as occupying Baldwin’s thought
and writing to the present day87 might be seen more accurately in the
earliest essays as his conscious development of a tensional motif of
acceptance and negation, resulting often in ambivalence or vacillation.
By examining the later essays chronologically and thematically, it will be
possible to determine if this pattern obtains.
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By Virginia Stem Owens*
The Proper Study of Mankind
I spent two years of my childhood on a military base in the Philippines.
Such communities are, by their very nature, encapsulated within the life
of the indigenous population. Yet now and again some shadowy authority
decided that we should have some contact with the strangers we
sojourned among. I remember for instance that the boys from a nearby
parochial school once came to play our school’s basketball team. We
stood around the rain-glistening ball court, absorbed not in the game but
in these lean, dark aliens calling to one another in unknown tongues. We
understood only the laughter, and it made us shy and touchy. A boy
would dash past, our eyes would inadvertently catch, and veer quickly
away again. Then his brown face would jerk back with insolent defiance,
he would toss the heavy black hair off his forehead and race on. I recall
that as one of the most frustrating days of my life.
Much more frustrating than the trips to the resort area of Baguio,
vacations filled with a panoply of the diverse peoples of the
Philippines—the Igorots, the Negritos, the Bontoks. Women of the
mountain tribes squatted on the edges of the bus stations selling green
bananas, their faces totally indifferent to any personal contact with their
customers other than conveying either through pidgin English or sign
language the price of their goods. They and the tall upright men standing
on one leg around the fringes of the crowd, gazing impassively over the
heads of the tourists, were like strange, exotic birds to us—fascinating,
fantastical, but not frustrating. As soon as the bus pulled away, both
groups went on with their insulated lives. We were equally unnecessary to
one another.
Except that my twelve-year-old mind could not quite accept it so
simply. Having learned in Sunday School of the infinite value to God of
each individual, I fretted to fit them into some understandable category.
They were not simply exotic birds; they were people like I was. Only not
like I was.
My family sometimes visited a couple of lady missionaries who lived in
an apartment in downtown Manila, just as though it had been Omaha or
Dallas. Perhaps they knew some secret inroad that led to these people’s
hidden existence, some way of slipping past the indifferent or implacable
stares into that elusive element called humanity that I had been taught all
people everywhere share.
Was it as hard, I wondered many years later, for Paul to make that leap
out of his own Jewishness into the alien culture of the gentiles? When he
became all things to all men in order that some might be gathered to the
gospel, was it as hard for him to eat pork as it would have been for my
*Virginia Stem Owens is a free-lance theological writer.
16
THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 17
family to eat the half-hatched eggs sold in the marketplace in Angeles?
Was it as difficult for him, the educated, analytical Pharisee, to form
intimate relationships with pagan idolators as it would be for me to
function faithfully in the Manhattan Playboy Club? I can shape the
questions into words now, but they first began to form, anxious and
inarticulate, on that invaded schoolyard basketball court.
I know now that culture is the name we give diverse patterns of human
behavior. The difference in the way the Igorot banana vendor and myself
perceive the passing of time, the function of clothing, our places in our
family, are what make us strange and unreal to one another. And
irritating as it may be, it is an inescapable fact that no human being can
live a cultureless life. Paul’s example was not in transcending cultures but
in immersing himself in them. The contingency of cultures—the fact that
they all change and that none of them seems to last forever—all this does
nothing to lessen the reality that there is no such thing as random
patternless human behavior. We all conform to some manner of life that
we consider “normal”.
The creature so glibly called “modern man”, by which we usually mean
Americans and not Arabs or aborigines, would like to think that he is able
to transcend his own culture simply because he is aware of it, just as he
once thought that becoming aware of psychological disease would cure it.
The notion that we are limited by anything—patriarchalism, matriarchal-
ism, tribal ties, food prejudices, sexual taboos—embarrasses us who like
to think of ourselves as above all that. Yet the world so far stubbornly
resists the excising of cultures.
Culture is the natural milieu of the human; it is the agar-agar in which
we grow. It chooses and cooks our food, molds our houses, cuts our
clothes, teaches us whatever is necessary to survive in our environment,
whether that be tracking a deer or operating a computer terminal. And
spiritualize it as we may, the Christian faith obstinately retains its
scandalous umbilical link to time and space and therefore to cultures.
Even God chose to operate within the first century Jewish cultural
context, to have his son brought up a Torah-believing, synagogue-going,
even tax-paying Jew. And while the culture that nourished him through
what would have been the first half of his natural life was also one of the
forces that saw to his early demise, he did not work towards eliminating it.
Instead, he went about his business, which was, one way and another,
calling people to live in that insupportable paradox: time and eternity.
H. Richard Niebuhr in Christ and Culture explains the Christian
dilemma this way: “In Christ there is neither Jew nor Greek, bond nor
free, male nor female; but in relation to other men a multitude of relative
value considerations arise.”1 As he affirms earlier, “The one who offends
‘one of these little ones’ is not equal in value for the ‘little one’ with its
benefactor.”2 Only God can stand outside history to judge it absolutely.
The rest of us are caught in the cage of time and space. All the works of
culture, including human justice and art, come from the relative value
considerations that are conditioned by our peculiar location in history.
Yet even those who accept the principle that cultural values are only
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relative cannot escape the urge to absolutize certain values. Margaret
Mead, for example, in her autobiography, Blackberry Winter? describes
her reactions to a tribe in New Guinea who were at best careless and at
worst murderously brutal with their children. Although she continued to
live among these people, recording their activities with all the detached
accuracy she had given to gentler tribes, she was so personally grieved by
their behavior towards children that this became her primary criterion for
judging the depravity or wholesomeness of a culture.
Theology and anthropology have between them honed into questions
these fears and frustrations that beset us when confronted with alien
cultures. We may be a twelve year old playing a Tagalog-speaking
basketball team or a sailor on shore leave taking pictures of the natives or
a commuter catching a glimpse of a migrant worker’s face through a
cracked school bus window. In such moments we question ourselves: Am
I simply a cultural bigot? Do dirt and diet make that much difference?
What is the common denominator of humanity anyway? Is there
something here that, my own cultural biases aside, is either profoundly
hostile or hospitable to humanity? And we also question the gospel: Was
it meant only for us and those of the western world who have a
background of Judaeo-Christian understandings? How can we know
when we are calling people to Christ and when we are merely calling them
to be like ourselves? What in scripture is only a part of first century
culture and what applies in all times and places?
Our answer too often has been to sink into desultory discussions of
comparative religions, illustrated by the same Time-Life series of books
or films on The Great Religions of Mankind that are used in the public
schools. It is at this point, where Christianity is reduced to just another
category alongside Buddhism and Islam that Bonhoeffer’s “religionless
Christianity” begins to make sense for many of us. If it is true, as social
scientists assure us, that all religions are merely ways of man’s relating
himself to the universe and finding his place in it, what becomes of our
claims for the uniqueness of Christianity? If there are important psychic
truths and clear apprehensions of God in other religions, how were they
come by? If Christians, as members of the “global village”, are to join in
those dull, defused dialogues not only with Marxists but also with
Buddhists, Hindus, and Moslems, to what can they appeal other than
their stubborn insistence upon the superior holiness of their scriptures as
compared to the Vedas or the Koran? And closer to home, what answer
will they give for the hope that is in them when their own children
announce their conversion to the latest domestic or imported cult?
In one of the best books ever written on this nettlesome subject, The
Everlasting Man, G. K. Chesterton, the Roman Catholic apologist,
writes:
. . . that while the best judge of Christianity is a Christian, the next best judge would be
something more like a Confucian. The worst judge of all is the man now most ready
with his judgments; the ill-educated Christian turning gradually into the ill-tempered
agnostic, entangled in the end of a feud of which he never understood the beginning,
blighted with a sort of hereditary boredom with he knows not what, and already weary
of hearing what he had never heard.4
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The church has passed through several stages in its relation to people of
bizarre backgrounds: shock and horror, warfare, dogged determination
to re-make them in our own image, exploitation, guilt, fear and currently
a sort of smug syncretism that is in some ways an expiation for the guilt of
the past and in others only a useful tool for implementing world-order.
Indeed, Margaret Mead herself has been one of the chief proponents of
the latter view. In her 1966 address to the World Conference on Church
and Society in Geneva, she said, “In particular, we need the support of
the churches for the application of all existing knowledge to the cause of
world order, international law and world-wide institutions.”5 Of course,
that was over ten years ago. Today one hardly need point out that we are
certainly no nearer global harmony despite the good intentions of various
religious bodies. As for world-wide institutions, we are beginning to
question their beneficence.
For ironically it is those very world-wide institutions that are making of
anthropology a science whose days are numbered. So-called primitive
cultures recede daily before the onslaught of industrialization; they are
bulldozed into a premature grave in order to make room for the
corporations of the “civilized” world.
When Margaret Mead set out on her first field work with Melanesians
prior to World War II, she realized even then that she was racing the clock
against the extermination of centuries-old human cultures. And when she
wrote in the late sixties of her return visits to these same villages, it was to
describe their transition into the contemporary world of taxes, banks,
public schools, and parliaments. Technological society is a juggernaut
moving irresistibly around the globe, leaving in its wake the flattened and
impoverished cultures of countless tribes and villages. “Only two
possibilities are left to the individual,” insists Jacques Ellul:
either he remains what he was, in which case he becomes more and more unadapted,
neurotic, and inefficient, loses his possibilities of subsistence, and is at last tossed on the
social rubbish heap, whatever his talents may be; or he adapts himself to the new
sociological organizm, which becomes his world, and he becomes unable to live except
in a mass society.6
One recognizes this immediately as a description of what has already
happened on the American Indian reservations.
Just as the Christian church is learning how to appreciate rather than
eradicate different cultures, they have begun to fade and disappear. How
many decades will it be till there is ony one more or less monolithic
industrial culture encompassing all the people of the earth? And what are
the implications of that historical shift? Already we look at the National
Geographic photographs of the Tasaday tribe in the Philippines, possibly
the last group of people on earth to have had no previous contact with
“modern man,” and it is like looking at a shimmering soap bubble
hanging for a breath in the air before it bursts. Perhaps we are just
beginning to learn ways of communicating the gospel to such strange folk
when, before our very eyes, they disappear and melt into homogeneous
humanity. What is our proper response to this turn of events? A sigh of
relief that we all now understand life in the same terms? A shrug at the
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inevitability of the process? A wistful nostalgia assuaged by old re-runs of
Tarzan movies and a meal at an “ethnic” restaurant?
It is only at the point where cultures are passing away (and although
they have always passed away sooner or later, never before have they
done so with such thoroughness and speed or so self-consciously) that we
become aware of the value of diversity. It is only by contrast with other
cultures that we can know and understand our own as merely relative.
What is to keep us, in the not distant future, from deifying our own human
patterns? The Romans, the last people to have come so close to
establishing a standardized civilization, seemed to have been bedeviled
by this same temptation. They ended by making their emperor a god. In
I Peter 4:10 the apostle exhorts his hearers to be good stewards of what
translates literally as “God’s multi-colored grace.” Is that grace to fade to
a monochrome under our stewardship?
Of course, although we are hurtling toward that state of affairs faster
than anyone cares to contemplate, we are yet in the transition stage.
There still remain huge populations who are indentifiably “other.” Yet
the amazing thing is that, no matter how impoverished a people’s culture
at first seems, there is always some custom, some story fragment, that can
serve as fertile soil in which the gospel can grow. But it takes careful
study, close attention, and a skillful imagination to do the transplanting.
Perhaps it would be easier than we imagine, even a refreshing relief, to
turn from our western introspection and study for a while the vanishing
variegated peoples of the earth, to force ourselves to feel out the shared
spiritual hungers of all people and to find the words that feed those
hungers.
1 New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951, p. 273.
2 Ibid.
3 Margaret Mead, Blackberry Winter: A Memoir. New York: William Morrow and
Company, Inc., 1972.
4 G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc.,
1925 (1955), p. 13.
5 Margaret Mead, A Way of Seeing. New York: McCall Publishing Co., 1966, p. 23.
6 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1964, p. 334.
By C. Eric Lincoln
White Christianity and Black
Commitment: A Comment on the
Power of Faith and Socialization
This essay is a part of a continuing effort to analyze and understand,
and to theorize about organized religion in the life and culture of
Blackamerica. My presuppositions are 1) that there does exist a viable,
identifiable black subculture in America; 2) that while this subculture
shares with other ethnic groups and with the overculture in general a
broad spectrum of experiences, values and institutionalized behavior
patterns, there is a unique element in its history commonly defined as
“the black experience;” and that 3) what is understood by the ingroup as
“the black experience” is a principal motivational force in the
development of a cultural black nationalism—which may be the
prevailing mood characterizing the contemporary black community.
Now the nationalistic impulse is directed toward the appreciation and
the elevation of whatever values and behavior thought of as unique to the
black community, or as originating with black people, or as peculiarly
appropriate to black ambience, style or projection. Implicit in this
attitude, of course, is a sense of cultural solidarity with the “Black World”
as well as an implicit devaluation of traditional “White” value constructs
which are the by-products of the socialization process. It is at this point
that the matter of the Christian religion becomes an issue of the most
critical importance, for the prevailing values in the overculture derive, or
are believed to derive, from a basic commitment to the Judeo-Christian
tradition. If this belief is true, then cultural black-nationalism must not
only imply a repudiation of prevailing social conventions, but of the
religious values which undergird those conventions; or at least some of
them.
Some contemporary black scholars in the positivistic tradition see
religion as a false issue, the worst aspects of it being the preemption of too
many good minds which might otherwise be turned to more pragmatic
pursuits. Religion, they argue, whatever its source, and whatever its uses
in the past is irrelevant today because black people have outgrown it. We
do not need religion to define our problems or to prescribe a means of
coping with them. We do need the total intellectual energies of the black
community directed toward the alleviation of empirical conditions we can
see and account for.
The black positivists are not alone in their desire to dismiss religion and
*Dr. Lincoln is Professor of Religion at Duke University.
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get on with social change. Their impatience with religion is shared by
black youth, but black youth are inclined to be more preemptory,
although their reasons for dismissing religion are quite similar, at
bedrock, to those of the black positivists. For the positivists, it is a matter
of having outgrown God. For black youth, it is a matter of having
outgrown history. For these latter, Christianity is “right out of the white
man’s bag of tricks,” and Blacks have outgrown trickery. Hence,
Christianity is left to those too young to understand and those too old to
change. The basic difference between the black positivists and black
youth is that black youth do not rule out summarily the legitimacy of some
other religion for black people, but it must be a religion untainted by
white association or white manipulation. It must be a genuine “black”
religion, not simply a black patina on a “white happening.” This is one
reason why black youth have not identified in significant numbers with
the new wave of “black religion” and its new “black theology” current in
the United States. Black religion, they say, is still “Christianity,” and
Christianity is tainted, perhaps irretrievably so, by the manipulative
racism with which it has been associated since it was first introduced to
Blacks in America, thereafter to shackle them through their faith to
centuries of servitude and depersonalization.
It is precisely this problem, the problem of the origin of the faith that
troubles the contemporary black believer. Unlike the black positivist who
has presumably reasoned through belief and beyond it, and unlike
contemporary black youth which tends to dismiss the faith on a priori
grounds which preclude the issue of belief or non-belief, the black
believer does believe. And he wants to believe. But he may be at odds
with himself precisely because he does believe. The problem is that
whatever its classical expression may have been, and whatever its claim to
ethical triumphs in other parts of the world, the prevailing Christian ethos
in America has seldom functioned in the fair and equitable interests of
black people as Blacks themselves perceive and understand those
interests. In consequence, the nagging recollection that Blackamericans
received the faith through their slavemasters, and then only after the
Christianization of the slaves was clearly established as uniquely
advantageous to the whole system of slave ownership,1 is a constant
irritant to the desire for conclusiveness. However certain he may be of the
essential validity of the faith as both timeless and universal, and however
firm his conviction that the faith transcends all attempts to manipulate it
and turn it to private advantage, the persistent allegations that
“Christianity is a white man’s religion,” or that “Christianity is a
slave-making religion” seem solidly buttressed by the wearisome facts of
experience.
Black ambivalence about the Christian religion is probably as old as
black contact with the faith in America. That they found Christianity
attractive at some level for whatever reason is most indisputably
documented by the fact that at least 98% of all Blackamericans confessing
any religion confess some form of Christianity; and by the fact that even
today when religious affiliation is no longer socially or morally
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compulsive, fully 95% of all Blacks in America admit to some connection
with some faith, no matter how tenuous. But accepting the faith and
accepting the conditions of the faith are not quite the same thing. For
much of the black experience with Christianity, the Christian message to
the black faithful could be typically illustrated by this quote from a
Virginia clergyman in the early days of black proselytization:
Servants, be obedient to them that are your masters. . . with fear and trembling . . .as
unto Christ. . . . Remember, God required this of you. . . . There is something sobecoming and engaging in a modest, cheerful, good natured behavior that a little work
done in that manner seems better done. ... It also gains the goodwill and love of those
you belong to. . . . Besides . . . your murmuring and grumbling is against God whohath placed you in their service. . . ,2
Undoubtedly this message had a telling effect upon many who heard it.
There were few competing messages of recognized authority, and what
came from the pulpit of the white man’s church was the revelatory
wisdom of the white man’s book. Who could gainsay it? Who could
understand it? It had the imprimatur of the white man’s God—the source
of the white man’s power, his wealth and his commission to rule. Who
could risk ignoring it? Lunsford Lane was one of those who did:
There was one kind-hearted clergyman I used often to hear; he was very popular amongthe colored people. But after he had preached a sermon to us in which he urged fromthe Bible that it was the will of heaven that we should be slaves and our masters our
owners, many of us left him, considering like the doubting disciple of old. This is a hard
saying. Who can hear it?3
As Lane and some of his fellows left the white minister who offended
them with his consignment of all Black Christians to the perpetual service
of their white brothers in Christ, other Blacks left the white man’s church
for similar reasons. Some lost themselves in that “invisible institution” 4
which met in the swamps and forests remote from the intelligence of the
Big House, safe from the noxious propaganda of the captive clergymen
who came there to strengthen the doubtful hand of the slave master with
the sure right hand of God. This “invisible institution” represented the
Black Christians’ covert rejection of the white church which rejected
them. However, other Blacks organized their own institutional churches,
which for the most part tended to replicate as nearly as possible the white
churches which were their references.
It is interesting to note that when Richard Allen and his confrerees
shook the dust of St. George Methodist Church off their spiritual feet
nearly 200 years ago, they did so because they had been dragged from
their knees in that white institution while inadvertently praying in a part
of the gallery reserved for white Christians.5 Nevertheless, the church
Allen founded soon thereafter was not only Christian, but Methodist,
which can only suggest the depth of attachment to the faith and to a
particular format of belief and practice embodied in institutional
Methodism. It could still be argued with validity, of course, that Allen’s
African Methodist Episcopal Church represented a giant step in freeing
black Christians from the religious tyranny of white Christianity, for
despite the wholesale adoption of the Methodist discipline, Blacks were
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finally to gain a measure of control of their own spiritual destiny, though
not without a protracted struggle.6 According to a public statement
concerning the establishment of Bethel, the “Mother Church’' of what
was to become the first black denomination, its members were to
“continue in union with, and subject to the government of the Bishops of
the Methodist Episcopal Church in all ecclesiastical affairs except in the
right to church property,” and would accept “the rules, government,
discipline and articles of faith of the Methodist Episcopal Church.” 7 The
pulpit at Bethel was under the control of an Elder of the St. George
Methodist Episcopal Church, the white institution from which they had
so lately detached themselves. Even so, the Blacks who retained their
traditional affiliation with St. George’s, hidden away in a corner of the
gallery and proscribed in every activity though they were, felt called upon
to denounce Richard Allen and to accuse him of leading his followers into
a “segregated church!” 8
The impact of Methodism upon Blacks was curiously phenomenal and
often inconsistent. In 1822, following the discovery that Denmark Vesey
and the principal conspirators involved in the plan to seize Charleston
were members of the African Methodist Episcopal Church—founded by
Richard Allen, the South Carolina authorities “suppressed that
congregation and had its house of worship demolished.” 9 On the other
hand, there is a tradition that when Nat Turner ravaged the countryside
on Southampton, Virginia in his bloody rebellion a decade later, he gave
orders that “none of the people called Methodists” were to be harmed.
Certainly Richard Allen’s commitment to Methodism was second only to
his commitment to Christianity. When the Free African Society which he
founded with Absolom Jones offered him the honor of pastoring the first
black Protestant Episcopal Church in history, “he declined the offer upon
the ground that he was a Methodist.” 10 When he left the Free African
Society intent upon founding a Methodist Church, he did so with the
conviction that:
There was no religious sect or denomination would suit the capacity of the colored
people as well as the Methodists, for the plain and simple gospel suits best for the
people; for the unlearned can understand, and the learned are sure to understand. . . .
I could not be anything but a Methodist as I was born and awakened under them. . . .
The Methodists were the first people that brought glad tidings to the colored people. I
feel thankful that I have ever heard a Methodist preacher.11
Allen’s sentiments were generally echoed by the black community.
Within five years following the Christmas Conference of 1784 which
formally established Methodism in America, one-fourth of the Methodist
membership was black.12 The Methodists split over the issue of slavery in
1844, but by the time the Civil War commenced in 1860, there were fully
200,000 Blacks in the southern wing of Methodism alone.13
This is not intended as a treatise on Blacks in the Methodist Church.
Instead we are concerned more precisely with the phenomenon of Blacks
in America choosing to be Christians at all, and once that choice was
made, why Methodism proved particularly attractive. Because Blacks
were involved in Methodism from its earliest appearance in America, and
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because Methodism does not differ substantially from any other white
Christian denomination in its practical approach to the issue of race,
Methodism does lend itself as a convenient model in the illustration of the
way in which Blacks in the presence of religious need and under pressure
of prevailing social norms not only adopted the religion of their
oppressors, but maintained membership in their religious organizations
long after they were at liberty to pursue their separate destiny. Were
there viable alternatives, or were the pragmatics of the situation such that
every apparent choice was an illusion?
Much has been made of the issue of African survivals in the religion of
Blackamericans. For years, the classic controversy between the followers
of anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits14 who thought he saw residuals of
African religion in Blackamerican beliefs and practices, and those of
sociologist E. Franklin Frazier,15 who was equally certain that nothing of
significance in African culture had survived the shattering impact of
American slavery, has titillated scholars in the field, and kept the
graduate students going back to the stacks to pore over the same meager
data for the same misconclusions. The data are rendered irrelevant, and
the issue of “survivals” in religion is mooted by the larger factors which
play a part in what the African diaspora might have done and did in fact
do in America.
First of all, a viable religion will be one which has a working
relationship with the culture with which it interacts. This is not to say that
it needs to be a “culture religion” in the sense that the values of the society
and those of the religion are indistinguishable. It is to suggest, however,
that religion has a practical base firmly rooted in the society which is both
molds and reflects. Further, the needs and conditions, the fears, the
anxieties, the hopes and aspirations to which a religion addresses itself
must be real in the experience of the believers. If it is not, the faith will
never be more than an aberration until or unless the culture is modified to
fit the faith.
The evidence of this would seem to be impressive. The missionary zeal
of Western Christians in Africa and elsewhere produced few Christians
until other agents of socialization had first “westernized” segments of the
native populations to the degree that Christianity simply made more
sense in the context of a scheme of values importedfrom the Westthan did
the indigenous religions. For example, in a society where the supply of
men is short and there are no satisfactory factors of compensation such as
we have developed here in the West, a religion that teaches monogamy
and sexual indistinction will have no significant appeal until those cultural
benefits and understandings which make monogamy and its attendant
arrangements viable in the missionizing culture are sufficiently institu¬
tionalized in the culture being missionized. In short, there is nothing
incidental about the structure of a religion and its relation to the society
which produces it, or makes it its own. Christianity was swept out of
North Africa by Islam after six centuries, not because Islam was a
superior faith, but because Islam was more readily accommodated to the
patterns of culture which antedated Christianity and its essentially novel
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requirements by two thousand years, or more. A viable religion will be a
functional expression of the society which births it, or at the very least it
will be a religion in which the expectations of the faith are not
incompatible with the existing norms, values and social experience by
which that society is shaped and structured.
We may say, then, that whether there survived any elements of African
religion in the dispersion of the African diaspora in America is not a
salient aspect of the phenomenon of African Christianity in America. For
almost a hundred years—from 1619 when the first Africans destined to
become a part of an English community were landed at Jamestown,
Virginia, until 1701 when the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in
Foreign Parts16 turned its attention to the evangelization of Blacks, the
Africans in America had little or no contact with Christianity. The
arguments against the Christianization of Blacks, bond or free, South or
North, were many and varied.17 They cannot be offered here in detail,
and my task will be limited to illustration of the fact that developing
American Christianity felt no compelling need to complicate prevailing
social and theological consensus by extending the gospel to black people.
If Blacks were not outside the boundaries of God’s grace, (and even this
was a matter of dispute), they were simply not within the boundaries of
American Christian interest and responsibility. There the matter rested
until the advantages of a Christian servant class were made explicit in the
pulpit and protected by law. Some American Christians flatly declared
“that the Negro was not a man but a beast, and that he had no soul either
to save or to lose.” 18 In fact, so many white Christians considered “the
Blacks as creatures of another species, who had no right to be instructed
or admitted to the sacraments,” that in eighteenth century New England,
this was considered “the main ‘obstacle to the conversion of these poor
people.’ ” 19
Many learned divines delivered themselves in debate on the subject,
attracting vast crowds anxious to hear the issue declaimed.20 Ultimately
the decisions of the American Christians probably turned on other
grounds. A European observer traveling in America in 1748 was struck by
the indifference of the Americans concerning the spiritual condition of
the Africans they had enslaved. He reported that the whites:
are partly led by the conceit of its being shameful, to have a spiritual brother or sister
among so despicable a people, partly by thinking that they would not be able to keep
their Negroes so meanly afterwards; and partly through tear of the Negroes growing
too proud, on seeing themselves upon a level with their masters in religious matters.21
The notion of sharing a brotherhood in Christ with Africans, in this
world, or any other, was certainly not a popular one. A common response
to so incredible a suggestion was said to have been, “What, such as they?
What, those black Dogs be made Christians? What, shall they be like
us?” 22 “Is it possible,” one distraught Christian lady wanted to know, “if
any of my Negroes could go to heaven, and must I see them there?” 23
Despite such prevailing attitudes about the possible social conse¬
quences of sharing the faith either in this world or in some other world to
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come, the fundamental barriers to the instruction or proselytization of
Blacks were basically economic. The slave system was geared to the
premise that black labor was a perishable commodity, and that its
extraction should be at a steady, continuous rate, to be interfered with
only under the most compelling circumstances. “Negroes” “were . . .
bought for the purpose of performing labor. What fact could be more
obvious and natural, less demanding of explanation?” 24 In a system
which routinely expected a slave mother to be back at her plow the same
day she “dropped” (i.e., gave birth to) a child, “church time,” including
the time spent at instruction, prayer, or other religious requirements, was
inevitably thought of as time garnered at the master’s expense, even if it
were taken when the slave normally would be resting and restoring
himself for the next day’s labor. Father John Carroll, a distinguished
Catholic clergyman and one of the first bishops in America, was sensitive
enough to be aware that the Blacks were “ ‘kept so constantly at work’
that their spiritual nurture was neglected, with the result that they were
‘very dull in faith and depraved in morals.’ ” But the good bishop like
many of his Protestant counterparts was apparently not unduly troubled
by the “dullness” and the “depravity” of the Blacks, for he owned, and
presumably “kept constantly at work” several of them himself.25 But the
ultimate fear was that the slave himself could be forfeited as a unit of
production if he confessed religion and became a Christian. It was not
until this spectre of economic loss was laid finally to rest by religious
authority and by law that a productive concern for the spiritual welfare of
Blacks in America could take hold.26
Once the barriers were removed, there was no great rush among Blacks
to become Christians. Despite nearly a hundred years of work by the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and other missionary-oriented
organizations and individuals, if there was hungering and thirsting for the
white man’s religion, by the close of the American Revolution, such a
yearning was still not reflected in the pews of the churches of New
England. Samuel Hopkins of Newport attributed the absence of the
Blacks to “their treatment by Christian masters,” a treatment he thought
well calculated to inflame the Blacks “with the deepest prejudices against
the Christian religion.” 27 By all the rules of logic the Reverend Hopkins
should have been right, but religion is often paralogical, and raw
prejudice has been known on occasion to produce a more accommodative
response than benevolent disdain. Indeed, this may in part account for
the fact that while the churches in New England has relatively little
success in attracting black constituents, in the South, the Methodists and
the Baptists “had gathered thousands of them into their churches before
the end of the eighteenth century.” 28 The truth is that there had been no
stampede toward the churches in the South either, until the Great
Awakening broadened the horizons of the faith to include a spectrum of
values and experiences to which Blacks were prepared to respond. The
Episcopal Church, dominant in the states where Blacks were most
populous, failed to attract a significant black constituency.29 The
Presbyterians and the Quakers, both more benign in their attitudes
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toward Blacks than either the Methodists or Baptists, had no more
success than the Congregationalists of New England, who were
considered “the most ardent friends” of the Blacks.30 The Catholic
Church had less impact upon the determination of the black religious
experience in America than any major faith with the exception of
Judaism. But then, in the developing years of the American Republic,
both Catholics and Jews were themselves under suspicion.
The Great Awakening aroused in thousands of Americans, white and
black, a new spiritual consciousness, which culminated, in many cases, in
church affiliation—mainly with Baptists and Methodists. Many theories
have been advanced offering to account for the black attraction to
Christianity at this peculiar moment in American history. Most of them
suggest that while New England Calvinism was too “cold” and too
“reasoned” for the African mind, Catholicism and Episcopalianism were
“too symbolic and ritualistic;” the Quakers “too meditative” and “too
reflective.” The burden of this argument, of course, rests upon the
common presupposition that black people are exuberant by nature,
impatient with symbolism and abstraction, and not given to reflection.
The world in which the African is at home has always been conceived as a
world of the senses, not a world of the mind. The practical effects of the
limited nature of the African personality was therefore to postpone his
significant religious involvement until the development of a religious
expression more nearly matched with his capacities and inclinations. The
Great Awakening, it is alleged, provided just that occasion: uncompli¬
cated preaching, with simple, vivid stories of illustration, opportunities
for substantial personal involvement and participation, a chance to give
free reign to the spirit and the emotions—all of which were thought to
replicate to some degree the normative African experience in religion. In
consequence of their deviation from established norms of religious
behavior, the practices of the Great Awakening came under fire from the
traditionalists of that day. A prominent New England minister
complained that:
So great has been the enthusiasm created by Wesley and Whitefield and tenant. . . the
very Servants and Slaves pretend to extraordinary inspiration, and under veil thereof
cherish their idle dispositions and in lieu of minding their respective businesses run
rambling about to utter enthusiastic nonsense.31
Whether or not the religious style of the Great Awakening was as decisive
for black involvement as is commonly held, the social style was
undoubtedly critical. The practical effect of established church proce¬
dures which required on the one hand that one must first go through a
period of instruction before admission, when at the same time most white
Christians held firmly to the belief that Blacks were incapable of
instruction, or that even if instructed could not fulfill the moral
requirements of the faith,32 was to keep Blacks out of the churches. In
New England where church membership and citizenship were closely tied
to each other, even free Blacks were effectively denied enfranchisement.
In the South, the worrisome problem of the legal status of a Christian
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slave was obviated and everywhere, the embarrassment of social equality
at the level of religion was precluded by the simple act of ignoring Blacks
as potential Christians. The Great Awakening was the first serious breach
in the formidable fortress of religious formalism which protected the
socio-economic infrastructure of the developing American common¬
wealth by being oblivious of the poor and the black.
Inevitably affected by the religious iconoclasm of the Awakening,
Blacks rushed to become Christians at this point not so much because
they could give vent to any “natural exuberance” or “native spiritual
ferver,” but because the rules which kept them on theplantations and out
ofthe churches were relaxed momentarily and the opportunity to enter into
new kinds of relationships with others in their world of contact were
presented. The consequences of their religious involvement in the Great
Awakening would be both immediate and far reaching. First of all the
argument about the black man’s spiritual and moral capacity would be
mooted by the fact that thousands of Blacks had accepted Christianity
and had been received as Christians. This was a fait accompli, impossible
as it was, it was. Second, while the religious test of the Awakening was
based on religious experience rather than theological and moral
understanding, some modicum of “education” at the information level
was inevitable in the process of Christian worship and fellowship. Third,
any kind of Christian association, even that of master and slave, modified
relationships and raised questions in the minds of all parties, which,
whether spoken or unspoken, added to the weight of maintenance of the
slave system. Finally, Christianity provided an organizational and a moral
base for self-liberation which the slaves were certain to exploit. In short,
once Blacks became Christians in large numbers, the wheels for the
eventual dissolution of the slave system were irretrievably set in motion.
Had the Great Awakening occurred a hundred years earlier, slavery as an
institution might not have survived the American Revolution. This is not
to overlook the probability that some Blacks were undoubtedly more
securely accommodated to their condition through the instrumentality of
religion. Such was inevitable, considering the susceptibility of Christian
teachings to distortion and misinterpretation. However, the visible
accommodation of some to a system of oppression could only become a
factor in the flux of the efforts of liberation.
The Great Awakening was the first major step in the socialization of
Blacks in America however inadvertent it may have been. It proved to be
their first introduction to the significant values which make America what
it is. Theretofore the vast majority of slaves were confined to the fields
from “can to can’t”—from daylight until dark. Their participation in the
culture, and their understanding of it was hardly any different from what
it would have been had they remained in Africa. Whatever religion they
may have practiced in the remote corners of the plantation could do little
for their present or their future in America. The Great Awakening was
the beginning of a process of Americanization that transcended religion.
The white man’s religion became, with some modifications, the black
man’s religion.33 There was no other way for the black man to find
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meaningful participation in the white man’s experiment in the West.
A distinguished sociologist has said that:
Americans are generally religious, Southerners are more religious than the rest of the
nation, and Negroes are more religious than white Southerners. The caste system
forces Negroes to be exaggerated Americans.34
If this is true the Black’s preference for Christianity in general, and for the
Methodist and Baptist churches in particular probably needs no further
explanation, for the black under caste was merely acting out its
aspirations by adopting the prevailing religious expression with which
they were in contact. But Arnold Toynbee reminds us that:
[The black man] may have found spiritual salvation in the white man’s faith; he may
nave acquired the white man’s culture . . . [and] economic technique, and yet it profits
him nothing so long as he has not changed his skin.35
This seems to say that the “white man’s” religion is not an effective
shelter from the white man’s more secular inclinations, and that
consequently the black man’s hopes for relief of his condition through
conversion to Christianity was doomed to failure. Toynbee was right, but
only if one takes the short view of history. There is no record that
conversion brought liberty to a single slave throughout the long history of
slavery in America. But there is a certain erosive quality in Christianity
which over the long run reduces its disharmonies to insequence and grants
its distortions into conformation. Once the slaves got religion it was
inevitable that slavery as an institution was doomed. Neither the South
nor the nation could thereafter restrain the spectrum of forces and
counter forces loosed in contention for the definition and the
establishment of a proper Christian ethic for America.
For the Blacks, religion became the primary occasion for social contact
with whites, and in consequence, the most important instrument of
socialization. The fact of religious capability not only granted souls to the
Blacks, but in doing so automatically raised them to the level of men, and
granted them some degree of moral responsibility. Religion did not raise
the presumption of racial or social equality, and it did not presuppose
Blacks to have a moral capacity equal to the white masters. Rather, the
black Christian was simply expected to do the best he could with the
equipment he had. God and society would forgive him the rest. But the
aura of strangeness and teratism surrounding the black field hands was
reduced, and the stage was inevitably set for the challenge and debate of
notions long held to be above challenge and beyond debate.
In the meantime, the black Christian developed a quality of faith of
unusual tenacity and resilience. In the face of the formidable contrary
evidence of his own experience, he persisted in the belief that God was
just, and that Christianity would be the instrument of his salvation if he
died, or of his liberation in due course if he lived. Undoubtedly, the
quality of his faith made the slave more tractable and patient, as Cotton
Mather and all the other advocates of black spiritual involvement had
predicted it would. But in the long run, the Christianization of the Blacks
worked toward their liberation. Certainly it is true that Christianity in
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America never approximated the ideals of the devout men and women
who saw in the English experiment here an opportunity to perfect the
faith in a way not possible amid the contentions and the distractions of
seventeenth century Europe. The notion of religious perfection, like the
spirit of the Enlightenment which stirred in the breasts of the Founding
Fathers succumbed ultimately to a virulent racism which had gone
unrecognized when the brave plans were made for the Atlantic
Experiment. The Americans sacrificed the dream of religious perfection
and the possibility of political democracy on the altar of a politico-eco¬
nomic scheme based on the presumption of racial superiority and racial
manifest destiny. American Christianity became an ideological factor in
the instrumentalization of this new and less respectable dream, and this is
the Christianity the Blacks received. Yet, it is improbable that the
espousal of any other religion by the Blacks would have hastened their
liberation. Perceived differences between whites and Blacks already vast,
would have been exaggerated. The suspicions of barbaric, paganistic
practices, like those assigned to the medieval Jew, would have
proliferated. Social distance, polar though it was, would have had no
basis for modification, and the opportunity for physical contact and
communication would have had no basis for regularity. The “peculiar
institution” which shamed and desecrated America would have been
indefinitely prolonged, and Christianity in America would be no further
advanced than it is in contemporary South Africa, if indeed it could have
come that far. Black faith in what was understood to be a white man’s
religion changed the course of our common history, and made of that
religion our common faith.
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By Gayle Pye Altizer
Flight as Affirmation in Two Plays of
Eugene Ionesco
This study will show the centrality of the theme of affirmation of life in
two dramas of Eugene Ionesco, an aspect of his work which has been
greatly underestimated by many of his critics. In these two plays it is the
symbol of being able to fly which chiefly represents affirmation. This
affirmation of life has an implicit theological orientation, even though
that orientation belongs not within the framework of traditional
Christianity, but rather in the context of “death of God” theology.
Ionesco, like the rest of the absurdists, sees a great deal of the world with
sad eyes; so much of human experience is negative. But there is also a
vitality and an affirmation within the terror which has not been
sufficiently brought to light.
After a brief examination of the theological dimension in Ionesco, the
paper will turn to a discussion of the pure life of spirit, of spirit freed from
the usual earthly limitations, as presented in Amedee, ous’en debarrasser
and in Lepieton de l’air. Thus the treatment will be principally thematic
rather than aesthetic, and the theme of spiritual “lightness” will be the
focus (though, of course, all of his major plays incorporate a rich and wide
mixture of themes).
By “theme” I mean to indicate the development of a concept or an idea
presented not through rational and discursive means as in an essay, but
rather one presented through artistic and symbolic means. A theme in
creative literature is handled indirectly, not by overt rhetoric but rather
through dialogue, imagery, symbolism, setting, and so forth. In effect,
this approach treats the themes or evolved ideas in some detachment
from the artistic elements of the plays, but it does not thereby ignore the
artistic elements. For the drama itself is the substance out of which the
ideas are created and presented. Significantly, Ionesco was cited in 1965
as a prime instance of the effort to communicate concepts which cannot
be adequately expressed by discursive logic. In an essay, “The Meaning
of Un-Meaning”, Richard Coe relates Ionesco to Buddhism saying that
Nirvana can only be described in terms of what is not and that Ionesco’s
dramas “incarnate in sensory and conceptual terms those things they are
not, in order that we may—however hazily and unclearly—grasp, or
approximately grope towards, the things they are”.1 These themes
emphasize the affirmation of life in the midst of absurdity and death.
Thus Ionesco’s work is directly concerned with man’s metaphysical
position in the universe. According to Martin Esslin, one of Ionesco’s two
*Dr. Altizer is Assistant Professor of English, Spelman College, Atlanta.
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basic themes is “the protest against the deadlines of present day
mechanical, bourgeois civilization, the loss of real /^//values, and the
resulting degradation of life. Ionesco attacks a world that has lost its
metaphysical dimension . . . . ”21 contend that Ionesco offers, in Amedee
and Pieton, a vision of man struggling in a world which is bereft of those
“felt” values and which is therefore basically alien to him. In this
situation, he seeks to find and reaffirm his essence which has gotten lost in
the morass of today’s existence ... an essence which is good and which
could transform present existence.
Ionesco’s more positive characters (here, Amedee and Berenger) may
in some ways be naive and trite, but if they are examined in the light of my
analysis, then it seems to me that their faith could represent not obtuse
ignorance but rather childlike unsophisticated sensitivity and trust. One is
reminded of Paul Tillich’s treatment of Eden in Volume Two of his
Systematic Theology wherein he describes it as a “dreaming innocence”,
as a state of totally innocent “essence” before that essence joins itself to
the state of “existence”, of concrete actuality, in which tension between
existence and essence is inherent because only in God are they one.3
Ionesco’s characters live in a godless world, a world where values, if
they exist at all, are fluctuating and/or empty. Jacobsen and Mueller place
Ionesco against the general background of the theatre of absurd and of
meaninglessness in the modern world generally. In so doing, they speak
of the Death of God:
The most terrifying absurdity of our century is the phrase “God is dead”. To come to
the belief, after many centuries in which the world’s order, meaning, and purposes have
been predicated on God’s being, that God has absented himself is to feel a strange
emptiness, homelessness, and disappearance of familiar guides and landmarks.4
The theatre of the absurd witnesses “not only to man’s sense of mortality,
alienation and robotization but also to his sense of God’s death”.5
In an essay which devotes much attention to Kafka, Ionesco has
commented upon the metaphysical feeling which one has in an absurd
world:
This theme of man astray in the labyrinth, without a guiding thread, is primordial, as we
know, in Kafka’s work: If man has no guiding thread, it is because he no longer really
wanted one. Hence his feeling of guilt, his anguish, the absurdity of history. Anything
without a goal is absurd: and the ultimate goal can only be found outside history, it
ought to guide the history of mankind, in other words to give meaning. Whether we like
it or not, this reveals the profoundly religious character of all Kafka’s work ... 6
Ionesco himself draws attention not so much to a “guiding thread” or a
goal as to a condition in which the positive and the negative are both
present in all parts of life, as “the obsessive truths [love, death and
wonder] that are most fundamental to us”.7 He also obliterates the
dichotomy between comedy and tragedy.
“As far as I am concerned”, says Ionesco, “I have never been able to understand the
difference that is made between the comic and the tragic. As the comic is the intuition
of the absurd, it seems to me more conducive to despair than the tragic. The comic
offers no way out. I say ‘conducive to despair’, but in reality it is beyond despair or
hope." But this is precisely the liberating effect of laughter . . . “To become conscious
of what is horrifying and to laugh at it is to become master of that which is horrifying
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. . . logic reveals itself in the illogicality of the absurd of which we have to become
aware. Laughter alone does not respect any taboos; the comic alone is capable of giving
us the strength to bear the tragedy of existence. The true nature of things, truth itself,
can be revealed to us only by fantasy, which is far more realistic than all the realisms”.8
Ionesco’s words “beyond despair or hope” seem quite important to me
because they support my thesis that his plays are not ideological
battlefields upon which either hope or despair is to be defended as the
ruling constituent of the universe. Rather, Ionesco attempts, through
comedy, to describe and make present man’s ultimate position in the
universe, and that position has much that is positive about it.
In Ionesco and Genet, Jacobsen and Mueller9 also adopt a thematic
approach which is metaphysical and, more specifically, theological. They
assert that Ionesco presents “a panaromic view of man’s history” in four
stages: “(1) What was the nature of the original paradise? (2) How was
that paradise lost? (3) What is the nature of the present fallen world? (4)
What is the vay, if any, of regaining pradise?”10 Thus they seek a mythical
structure I isting Amedee under original paradise and Pieton under
redemptio ) wheras I seek a structure of “meaning” in life and therefore
treat the two plays together as representing free, creative spirit as it
struggles to overcome the world’s barriers to its life.
Ionesco has two sets of thematic categories which he himself has
devised:
Two fundamental states of consciousness are at the root of all my plays . . . .These two
basic feelings are those of evanescence on the one hand, and heaviness on the other; of
emptiness and of an overabundance of presence; of the unreal transparency of the
world, and of its opaqueness .... The sensation of evanescence results in a feeling of
anguish, a sort of dizziness. But all of this can just as well become euphoric; anguisn is
suddenly transformed into liberty.
. . . This state of consciousness is very rare, to be sure.
... I am most often under the dominion of the opposite feeling: Lightness changes to
heaviness, transparence to thickness; the world weighs heavily; the universe crushes
me. A curtain, an insuperable wall, comes between me and the world, between me and
myself. Matter fills everything, takes up all space, annihilates all liberty under its
weight .... Speech crumbles ... 11
It is the sense of heaviness which is, of course, most familiar to
Ionesco’s audience. And this “heaviness” is at least in part due to the
death of God, to the disappearance of “real, felt values”. Nevertheless,
within this “heaviness” there is a desperate struggle to live effectively
which is often overlooked, and it is the element of struggle which makes
even his most devastating plays positive. But here the intent is to examine
two plays where “lightness” momentarily reigns supreme. This lightness
occasionally overpowers some of his characters, carrying them far beyond
the confines of ordinary existence. Here there is not struggle, but rather
sheer joy which simply overwhelms, which somehow—even if only
temporarily—abolishes and nullifies all the pain and ugliness and
uncertainty and horror. Such is the case with the hero in both Amedee and
Pieton.
“Lightness” and “Heaviness” are, of course, metaphorical terms and
need to be translated into critically viable terms. One way to express them
is to contrast euphoria and evanescence with depression and paralysis.
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Within these overall terms are three sets of opposing categories which
appear in both of these plays: self-expression versus sterility, love versus
alienation from the loved one, and freedom versus alienation from society
and/or capitulation to it. In both plays lightness and euphoria are
symbolized by the spontaneous flight of man.
Amedee, in Amedee, has been weighed down for fifteen years by a
deadly, sterile marriage, by an inability to write his play and by a
corpse—a corpse growing steadily by geometric progression—in his
bedroom. His wife, Madeleine, is unable to share the love, tenderness,
vision of freedom and evanescence Amedee tries to offer her. She is
steady and dependable, but cold and rough. Amedee is finally driven, by
the corpse’s sheer bulk (it is growing larger than the apartment) to take it
onto the streets and dispose of it. Suddenly, this ponderous body becomes
a gigantic balloon and Amedee floats away; when his wife objects, he
protests loudly and pathetically (though the crowd comments that he
looks happy enough) that he cannot help abandoning her. He ascends in
spite of himself. As he floats ever higher, he generously disperses his
clothing and cigarettes to the crowd below.
Thus freedom and euphoria are seen as joyous, as compelling and as
irresponsible. For if he floats away forever, he can never finish his play
(self-expression) and cannot achieve union with his wife (love). His
freedom is consequently somewhat Gnostic in that the concrete, material
world must be abandoned in order to reach such freedom. It is entirely
conceivable, however, that Amedee will return, and the play closes as the
crowd speculates on this possibility. If he does return, it is not impossible
that the experience of liberation and the disappearance of the corpse will
render him better able both to write and to draw Madeleine into his vision
and experience of love. The flight is thus both a defense against his
present failure, an escape from his inability to cope, and also a liberation
which may open the way for future fulfillment.
In Lepieton de l’air, Berenger (also a writer), his wife and daughter
(Josephine and Marthe, respectively), are living in England (temporarily,
it seems). The family goes for a Sunday stroll and Berenger suddenly
starts to walk a foot or so above the ground. His practical wife and other
adults scold at such frivolity, while his daughter and other children in the
area are entranced. Berenger insists that true flight is a natural capacity of
man\ it has nothing to do with the technology of the airplane but is rather
innate and childlike, something we have forgotten how to do, something
most have forgotten that we ^frknew how to do. Here one is reminded
of Mircea Eliade (a friend and countryman of Ionesco) who conceives of
the condition of modern man as constituting a “second fall”, a symbol
which parallels the death of God. Eliade contends that the fall occurred
when man ceased to be wholly at one with the sacred and that at this point
religion arose, for man still remembered “that time” or paradise and
sought to return to it by re-creating it through sacred ritual.12 Today, he
contends, man has lost the memory of “that time” and has therefore also
lost any conscious desire to return to it.13 Ionesco’s adults have lost the
conscious desire to fly.
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Faith and desire play perhaps the most important role of all in the
recovery of the ability to fly. “It’s perfectly simple. All you need is the will
to do it. You’ve got to have confidence”, declares Berenger. We learn
that truly desiring to fly is sufficient to make flight possible, even easy,
provided one accepts it as natural and approaches with confidence rather
than with fear. Loss of faith, and consequently loss of altitude, occur
when one does not believe in and accept it as natural.
One thinks here of some close parallels with certain New Testament
themes, particularly in the Synoptic Gospels. To desire the Kingdom of
God truly, desire it enough to put one’s whole confidence in it, is to be
assured that God will admit one. One must turn away from what seems to
be the natural order of things, from all that seems obvious in the worldly
point of view, from the “old aeon”, and accept instead life in the
Kingdom as the true estate to which God summons us in our deepest
natures.* Similarly, Berenger in Pieton refutes the obvious “fact” that
man cannot fly, despite the ridicule and criticism of all those around him
except Marthe, the child, who truly believes and can see reality as he sees
it. The rest catch only fleeting glimpses or do not see it at all.
As Jesus emphasizes the need for faith, and often, in the healing
stories, tells the cured man that his faith has healed him, so Berenger
emphasizes the need to believe that flying is natural and to have
confidence so as not to fall. One is reminded of the story of Walking on
Water as told in Matthew. When Peter, following his Master, begins to
doubt, he begins to sink, and Jesus rebukes his lack of faith.15 This theme
is also similar to Jesus’ calming the storm and rebuking the disciples for
being afraid.16
Much of the message of Jesus emphasizes the simplicity, directness,
spontaneity and total absorption of faith, and it is commonly held that
these are the qualities of childlikeness which are needed to enter the
Kingdom. Similarly, simplicity, directness, spontaneity and utter
fascination characterize the children in Ionesco, and also Marthe and
Berenger. Their complete absorption again parallels Jesus’ repeated
demand for total dedication to the Kingdom along with his claim that such
dedication is a joy and a delight, not a burden, for the Kingdom is
something which captivates one completely by its attractiveness.17
The Kingdom is, however, something which comes into this world and
transforms it, not a far away land to which we escape from this world, and
in his second flight Berenger is soon to discover a vast difference between
his joyful flight within the world and his flight beyond. Gradually, he rises
and flies out of sight; then he returns, much saddened to tell his family
that beyond the horizon there is only a terrible Apocalypse-like vision of
men with heads of geese, “Men licking monkeys’ behinds and drinking
the sows’ piss”.18 He saw giant grasshoppers, fallen angels and
This is not to suggest, as did nineteenth century liberalism, that the Kingdom of God is
found by man’s following his “natural” and moral impulses, that man in his present nature
just needs to improve his standards. Rather, it is a radically new and transformed nature to
which man essentially belongs, just as the naturalness of flying is radically opposed to and
different from what man in his present state deems “natural”.
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vanquished archangels; thousands of men being whipped, the whole of
paradise in flames where the Blessed were burning, and knives and
tombs. Ultimately, Berenger went beyond our spatial directions and
“reached the ridge of the invisible roof where space and time come
together’’.19 He saw bottomless pits on deserted plains. At this point the
crowd draws apart in fear, just as they did when he suggested that they
come with him and learn to fly. Only his family hears of the final scenes of
infinite expanses of ice and fire. “Deserts of ice, deserts of fire battling
with each other and all coming slowly toward us . . . nearer and nearer
and nearer”.20 Unlike the others, his daughter and his wife believe him,
and the latter asks him to take them immediately—one under each
arm—and fly them “much further away, far on the other side of Hell”.
But Berenger replies, “I’m afraid I can’t my darlings. After that, there’s
nothing . . . nothing but abysmal space . . . abysmal space”.21
The Gnostic tinge does not appear in this play, not only because
Berenger returns to his wife and family, to the earth—which is the most
important point—but also because the life of spirit flying unfettered and
separated from earth encounters not joy and salvation, but infinite terror.
Berenger returns to cry and conquer this world.
Just as Berenger describes the abyss to his family, they see the red lights
in the distance and hear music which is “tristement ’gaie’ ”.22 Marthe
confesses she is afraid, but Berenger assures her it is only the festival, a
sort of English July fourteenth. With bowed heads, they turn toward the
village.
Despair may seem to be the only answer, and yet Berenger is relieved
that, for now at least, reality presents only firecrackers, not deserts of
fire. Also Marthe—who represents both vision and realism—has the final
lines, saying: “Perhaps that’s all that’s going to happen, just firecrackers
.... Perhaps it will all come right in the end .... Perhaps the flames will
die down, perhaps the ice will melt, perhaps the depths will rise. Perhaps
the .... the gardens .... the gardens . . . ”23 They go out as a family
bound together and reunited after all have seen terrible visions, some
earthly and some beyond this world. Marthe has been able to see beyond
the nightmare phantoms of her mother and is able to express hope even
after Berenger’s testimony about the beyond. And in spite of everything,
they are united in love. God is dead and infinity or the beyond appears
only under the guise of terror. Nevertheless, here and now, love and unity
reduce the apocalyptic horror to the proportions of mere firecrackers.
The meaning of flight in the preceding seems to be that flight is a
legitimate, joyous and creative power which symbolizes the lightness,
freedom and evanescence which belong to man’s spirit. It constitutes an
imagination not weighed down by the banality and emptiness of much of
ordinary life. However, flying too far, flying beyond the world (instead of
flying within the world as Berenger does at first) cuts both Amedee and
Berenger off from literary creativity and from family and love, at least for
the duration of the flight beyond. And for Berenger it involves a vision of
ultimate terror. The symbol of flight is thus an ambiguous one
representing freedom and imagination and also isolation and horror.
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Flight is necessary to man’s happiness, as Berenger claims, but it must be
carried on without cutting oneself off from the real world. Like the
Kingdom of God, it should be a transformation within the world, not an
escape from it.
Given the ambiguity of the symbol, it is not surprising that critical
interpretations are varied and often negative. Flight could mean either
that the world is hopeless since the ultimate reality Berenger sees is one of
infinite terror, or it could mean that flight is an escape from reality and
man must find his salvation otherwise.
I offer here the interpretations of three critics, ranging from negative to
positive. On the negative side, Jacobsen and Mueller say that Berenger
has ventured “into the world of physical death, where, he hopes, he will
find the joys of which this world has furnished an imitation”.24 However,
his return is “heralded by a graying landscape” and lovely country turned
to smoking ruins. Buoyancy is destroyed because the other world is a
bottomless abyss filled with horror: he has seen that the “desert wastes of
this world are but dim adumbrations of the full horror and nothingness
which is to come”.25 His answer that beyond Hell there is nothing is an
acknowledgement of the Killer’s shrug.26 Marthe’s curtain lines offer no
more than “a ghost of a hope”.271 feel that this interpretation is far too
negative, that the flight is liberating as well as terrifying and that the end
does offer hope.
Pronko offers a mildly positive interpretation. First he attributes to
Gouhier the declaration that the Berenger characters are “symbolic of
the refusal to submit to the pressures of society.” Man’s nature, memory
and dreams seem to point to “a being perfectly integrated in nature, to
whom flying, like walking, is second nature”.28 He is at ease and joyous.
“But, alas”, Pronko says, “Berenger’s story is simply one of wish
fulfillment, for although he claims man can fly as high as infinity, his
experience shows that sooner or later he must bump his head against the
sky and come tumbling down”.29 Pronko, however, sees the voyage into
outer space as also being a voyage within, through which he discovers his
own personal death as well as “the possible annihilation of the human
race”. The Bosch-like visions suggest the terror of war in the atomic age.
The flight itself he sees, nevertheless, less as a wish fulfillment than as an
expression of the creative spirit. The more level-headed and unimagina¬
tive wife is embarrassed by the poetic and physical flights and tries to hold
him down, but the daughter shares his visions “which suggests . . . that
the poetic and childlike are neighboring worlds”. For his flight
“represents his inspiration, his writing. He flies because he is powerless to
do otherwise . . . ”30 Against those who seek a more practical purpose for
his levitation, he stands opposed to mechanization “for a human
universe” and for going back to “natural ways of doing things”.31 Thus
the flight is valuable for its own sake, regardless of what the terrors of the
universe may be. With this much I can agree. I cannot, however, accept
his statement that the end of the play offers “no affirmation, simply the
wish that the garden might bloom again”.32
Finally, Senart offers an interpretation which—curiously enough—is
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by far the most religiously orthodox and explicitly theological and which,
at the same time, presents the most positive view of the conclusion of
Pieton. Ionesco offers, he says, a theatre where man tries to reclaim
God’s promise through a rediscovery of childhood.33 But, says Senart,
Berenger mistakenly believes that to wish to fly is to be able to fly and he
interprets this attitude to mean that Berenger thinks he can be God if he
likes.34 Thus Senart’s assessment of flight is negative. Redemption, he
argues, does not come from attaining high altitude as Berenger believes.
Salvation comes from re-entering one’s own heart which is where the
Father dwells.35 Rather than imitating angels, we should nail ourselves to
the Cross if we wish to become God. He says Amedee perhaps
accomplishes man’s Passion in extricating the corpse (“la Faute”) from
his apartment, and he appears to agree with Berenger that ifwe love men,
there’ll be no more strangers and no more Hell.36 Berenger flies free and
can go where he wishes ... to the end of the world if he likes. But the
world has no end.37
Nevertheless, he sees in Berenger’s return to earth and to the family a
positive outcome, perhaps Ionesco’s most positive one. The road along
which M. Ionesco and his family travel is not a “dead end” (as Senart
believes the throne to be in Exit the King—an interpretation I would
strongly resist), but a road which continues to wind through the
countryside towards shadowy gardens and uncertain hopes.38 I would
agree that the outcome is positive as Senart says, though I am far from
embracing his theological tenets which wholly ignore the chaotic, modern
world for which “God is Dead”, and to which I believe M. Ionesco
primarily directs his writings.
It is important that Senart links the flight to the return to earth, even
though I do not agree that the flight was quite simply a mistake. For the
meaning of the flight must be considered in terms of its effect on
meaningful human relationships as well as in itself. Senart sees the ending
not as a defeat forcing Berenger to return, but as a positive affirmation of
the world and of the emphasis placed on love and human ties in the play. I
would add that the flight has also deepened and enriched these ties.
Flight represents lightness, freedom from heaviness. True it is in part a
defensive reaction. Both Amedee and Berenger are trying to escape from
defeat and/or frustration. But the symbol of flight is basically ambivalent;
the negative aspects do not rule out the positive values. In my view,
Berenger’s flights, both the early one within the world and the later one
beyond it—for the two are quite distinct, however, often that distinction
may be ignored—are each positive. The former offers joy and exuberance
and creativity here and now, a sort of living both within the world and
beyond it. (One might be reminded of Paul’s admonition to be in the
world but not of it.) The later flight confronts Berenger with the ultimate
horror of life in its most brutal and unmitigated form. The fact that he
finds darkness rather than light in the higher reaches does not prove that
he should have stayed earthbound any more than the Crucifixion and the
Descent into Hell prove that Jesus should never have preached and led
the disciples. The fact that Berenger returns to earth and the family does
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not prove that he should never have left in the first place. For he returns
with a deeper awareness than he had when he left. His childlike
exuberance may have been partly destroyed or seriously chastened;
Josephine’s fears have been confirmed by the reality of what he saw.
Yet he is stronger when he returns than when he left. Shaken and
saddened, he still takes charge of his family, and reassures them
concerning the fading fireworks of the festival. And although he affirms
that there is nothing beyond Hell but the infinite abyss, he emphatically
adds (twice) that there is no danger “pour le moment”. The only present
“horror” is harmless firecrackers. And to this is added Marthe’s hopeful
closing speech.
The play ends, as Senart contends, with the family headed uncertainly
into the future; and in the end they are decidedly earthbound. But quite a
lot of wisdom, liberating as well as saddening, has been gained in the
course of the play. Flying is neither as simple nor as joyous as it initially
seemed; like all else, it is accompanied by tragedy. Orthodox theology
has no place here, but nevertheless there is a kind of immanent “death of
God” faith which asserts the value of going beyond the world in order to
enter more deeply into it. The resurrection is not an erasure of pain and
an ascension to heaven, but rather a return—with far deeper
awareness—to the total context of life and to a family bond of love which
will henceforth be stronger, whatever the future may hold.
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By Jeffrey G. Sobosan1
An Homage to Betelgeuse
It is incredibly easy to become engrossed in what I would call the “cult
of the immediate”. It is easy to dim one’s vision, one’s cares, loves, even
hatreds to what is at hand in place or time. It is easy to deal with a future of
a few coming weeks, or years, or even generations. It is easy to limit
oneself to concern only for one’s own life, or that of one’s children or
grandchildren. It isn’t very difficult to love or hate an object with which
one is immediately or proximately involved, something with which one
has a close, personal bond. One can love his children and grandchildren
easily. But it becomes increasingly difficult to feel a similar love toward
one’s children generation upon generation hence. Would Abraham see
an Isaac in all his children today?
The following analysis, then, might best be construed as an exercise in
chance-taking. For it takes as the cue to its reflections an event which lies
before us not just in a few years or generations, but in many eons. The
chance is that it will thus offend the attraction toward the immediate
noted above. But I believe this chance should still be taken, since this
event, as I will argue, though many eons away from us, is one upon which
we are utterly dependent and before which we must decidedly base
present activity. If the perspective of one’s concern, then, does not extend
beyond proximate interests, the following reflections will likely mean
little; if one’s perspective is broader, however, as broad as the continued
existence of human life, perhaps they will strike a chord and elicit some
serious thought in the reader.
One of the aims I also hope to achieve in the following reflections is to
demonstrate that although we may be utterly dependent upon certain
events, this dependence need not be construed as a slavery. By this I
mean that despite our dependence on the event, we may still act in face of
it in a manner which, although it cannot alter the event itself (the event is
inevitable), can alter our position in its regard.
In the mentality of slavery, on the other hand, not only the event itself
but one’s position in its regard is thought to be irrevocable. There is
nothing one can do to alter either, and so one accepts their irrevocability
and goes on living as always.
A sense of slavery is the defeat of the creative possibilities within men;
a sense of dependence is the recognition that these possibilities must
operate within certain limits. Slavery takes freedom away from the
individual; the recognition of his dependence provides an operative
context for his freedom. In the first state freedom dies; in the second it
survives, usefully and with intent.
Dr. Sobosan is a member of the Department of Theology, University of Portland.
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The Limits of Thought
There are a variety of ways in which an inquiry regarding the limits of
thought may be approached. One may do so, for example, within a
formally philosophical ambience, somewhat like Kant, stressing the logic
of the cognitive process and the boundaries it imposes on the domain of
rationally secure knowledge. Or one may do so within a formally
theological ambience, somewhat like Luther, stressing the sin and
fallenness of humankind, and the blighting of the mind which is their
result. Or one may do so within an ambience melding both of the above,
somewhat like Aquinas, and explain the sin and fallenness spoken of by
theology within the context of a philosophy of knowledge, thus affirming
within each ambience the limits of availably certain knowledge attainable
of one’s own accord, by one’s own reasoning process.
There are, of course, other ways whereby the limits of thought might be
approached. There is, for example, the obvious approach of genetics.
Here thought is limited in any given instance because the individual is
inherently (physically) incapable of knowing more than he does.
Limitation due to accident or disease could be construed as a sub-heading
of this approach. There can, furthermore, be what we might best describe
as a deliberate limiting of thought, that is, a more or less consistent refusal
to extend one’s knowledge, to expose oneself to new ideas, or doubts
about old ones. This approach is frequently found within religious
psychology, among men and women who have built a mental fortress
around what they think of God, Christ, virtue, vice, and so on. It is also
demonstrated, more generally, in any steady refusal to re-examine
judgments, especially judgments of other people, by broadening those
limits of one’s knowledge or awareness upon which such judgments are
based.
What the above paragraphs are meant to indicate is simply the idea that
our thought is indeed limited; or more correctly, that arguments and
observations can be brought to bear which convincingly demonstrate this
idea. These limitations are imposed either by the nature of thought itself
(as in a-personal epistemological arguments), or by ourselves, through
indeliberate circumstances (genetic make-up, disease, accident) or a
deliberate act of the will (that is, freely chosen close-mindedness).
Yet there is a still further approach to this whole question of the limits
of thought, which at first glance might seemingly settle it once and for all,
because it seemingly settles the even more basic question of the very
limits of humankind. Only very rarely has it been seriously discussed by
theologians or philosophers, finding extensive interest, instead, only
among the exclusive company of professional scientists or the fanciful
musings of science fiction writers. It establishes the uttermost limits of
thought, as we said, right where these limits most commonsensically lie:
at the uttermost biological limit currently conceived for the continued
existence of man on earth.
In what follows I intend to examine this idea more fully. It will initially
involve us in a somewhat mind-boggling excursion into distances of time
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and space—whose result, however, may hold the seeds not just of a
possible despair, but of a possible hope as well.
Fearful Expanses
The universe is inconceivably large. This is a fact of which we are all
aware, but which seldom, if at all, forms the content of a meditation. We
are more prone, let us admit, to exhaust our energies on self-reflection,
on ourselves—on our seeking, for example, an integrated or whole
personality, its joys and pains. Yet all around us, in the day but especially
the night sky, glows the universe, the stars, the unearthly phenomena
before us, if we but turn our vision from inward to outward, and raise our
heads. It was indeed with justification that Kant saw in this outward
universe the second of the two sources which caused him wonder.1 It is the
wonder of the partially known, about which what is unknown is a
seduction, stretching our curiosity to ever further lengths in order to be
satisfied. It is the wonder which says, the more I know, the more I want to
know; what lies beyond the present limits of my knowledge? So it is, so it
must be, with thought about the universe.
Recent estimates of this wondrous universe, for example, or at least
what astronomers call the “observable universe”, give some of its least
argued dimensions as follows. Its diameter is 26 billion light-years (light
travels at about 186,000 miles per second); 2 its age is probably
somewhere over 15 billion years; 3 it contains an unknowable number of
galaxies,4 though 10 billion are within the range of the 200-inch Palomar
telescope: 5 and a galaxy (for example, Andromeda) may contain in
excess of 200 billion stars.6 As just these figures indicate, the size of the
universe in time and space is beyond even our best imaginative abilities.
We are at a loss to picture an expanse of billions of miles, a content of
billions of stars, or an age of billions of years. We can merely assert the
facts, and like Kant stand awed before them in wonderment, wanting to
know more.
Betelgeuse is but a single ruby in this wonderfilled expanse of time and
space. It is a star; and like all others, it is of a particular class. It is what
astronomers all a “red giant”, and on a clear night, if you look at the
constellation Orion, you can see it, sparkling and distinctly red to the
naked eye.7 Yet this is so despite the fact that Betelgeuse is in excess of
1600 light years away,8 so that the conclusion easily forces itself upon us:
what appears to us from that distance as a small lovely crystal in the sky, is
in reality monstrously large. And so it is. For Betelgeuse is, by the best
estimates, 300 million miles in diameter; that is, compared with our own
sun’s diameter of 850,000 miles, it is 350 times as wide as the sun, and has
about 120,000 times the sun’s surface area.9 We can see Betelgeuse, in
short, because it is so incrediby, almost unimaginably large. If it were
placed in the position our sun now occupies in the solar system, its
diameter would fill out a space beyond the planet Mars.
Our sun, impressive as it is to our eyes, thus pales in actual fact beside
Betelgeuse, almost identically to the way the Earth pales when compared
to the sun. Yet the future will tell a different tale. For Betelgeuse is on a
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declining spiral. As a red giant it has reached its apogee; from there it
must hopelessly shrink through a series of contractions and explosions to
a point where it will be lost to our unaided sight, and finally even to our
best optical telescopes. It will eventually end up as a very tiny neutron
star—ten miles or so in radius 10—or perhaps one of those phenomena
just recently discovered, the even tinier and elusive “black hole”.
Betelgeuse, in the vast compass of cosmic time, is at its moment of glory,
showing its splendor to us now. But its beauty, like all beauty, is doomed;
for the rest of time it can only fade.
Our sun, on the other hand, is spiralling upwards. Officially it is
classified as a “yellow star”, leaving its youth as stars go, and on its way
toward the colossal size that now describes Betelgeuse. This will take
some time, of course, even by cosmic standards; but the path is clear. By a
complicated process of atomic-chemical reactions, the sun will begin to
grow, until, like Betelgeuse now, it also becomes a ruby in the sky,
glowing red instead of white, and achieving its age of fullest growth and
beauty.
But as such it will be seen only by those far outside our Earth, just as we
on Earth now see Betelgeuse from afar. For the redness which now marks
the singular beauty of Betelgeuse against the sky, will in our sun mean fire
for the Earth. It will mean cataclysm, disruption, rending, and dissolution
which even the wildest apocalyptic visions fail to capture. Quite literally,
the Earth will melt; and if anything at all of it should survive the red
giantism of the sun, it will be only a burnt out cinder, possibly smaller than
the moon, with no atmosphere, no flora, no fauna. Without question, the
Earth, or what if anything remains of it, will be hopelessly barren and
dead of life. And no fantastic or frantic imaginings will ever alter that fact.
This thought is sobering. It is the death of all illusions that the Earth will
continue forever. It is the final disenchantment in that whole series which
began with Copernicus, when the Earth was replaced from the spatial
center of the solar system by the sun. For just as the position of the Earth
became increasingly limited in space as more and more was learned of the
solar system, galaxies, and the universe as a whole, so does knowledge of
the sun’s evolution demand the admission that the Earth’s temporal
dimension is also limited. The Earth, in short, is not eternal; it if finite. As
it has been subject to growing insignificance as knowledge of the stars has
increased, so has its end in time been sealed as knowledge of its sun has
increased.
There is, of course, some consolation in all this, insofar as neither we
nor our descendents for many thousands of generations will be alive to see
the sun transformed into a twin of Betelgeuse. But the consolation pales
before the nakedness of the sheer thought itself. If we, men, women, the
human race, are to assure our continued survival—and whether it be
within the next several years or the next several eons11 is here
unimportant to the bald question itself—then within the next several eons
we will have to be somewhere else, which means off the face of the Earth,
onto another planet. For nothing technology will ever deivse can keep us
safe at home when the sun turns red.12
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Perhaps the religious consciousness, therefore, which spoke the words,
in a vision of the world’s end, that the moon had turned to blood,13 was
closer to the literal truth of the matter than it could have ever known. For
indeed the moon, whose light is a reflection from the sun, will burn to
blood, the red of blood, when the sun becomes another Betelgeuse. But
from the Earth the vision will always remain what it now is, namely, a
vision of the future from the past. For no one, unless he views it from
another planet will see the vision come true, though come true it most
definitely will, with the passing of time. Such a religious consciousness,
like the vision it records, is indeed apocalyptic; it breaks, it shatters, it
destroys all our spoken and unspoken thoughts that the Earth, generous
mother to our birth and rearing, is eternal.
Religion must learn to deal more fully with this thought, not only in
those rare instances where it may partly contribute to psychic breakdown
(“If God is good, why is everything so seemingly futile?”), but in general
religious theory as well. How, if at all, does the fact of the eventual
dissolution of the Earth affect current theories of the “new Earth” spoken
of in scripture?14 What consequence, if any, does this fact have for the
notion of a redeemed creation through the atoning work of Christ? What
effect, if any, does it have on all apocalyptic theories of the end of the
world, the “Day” of Jahweh? It is thought about the fact of the eventual
dissolution of the Earth which is important here, not the proximity of the
fact. It is the thought which must affect our theory and interpretation, not
in the future but now. For our current theory and interpretation of such
questions cannot “act” as if the fact, or thought about the fact, should not
exist. It should, it does, and it cannot be ignored, or even worse and less
intelligently, ridiculed.
It could even be suggested that the above demand for reflection is one
possible approach to the difficult issue of Jesus’ own apocalyptic
consciousness of the passing of the world. The urgency with which he
speaks on this matter could then be understood as not so much indicative
of a belief in the proximity of the physical disruption of the Earth, but of
the necessity to deal with the thought that the Earth will not last, that it is
not imbued, like some pagan goddess, with a divine eternity. The Earth
will come to destruction, Jesus might then be saying, and thought on this
fact (whenever it is actually realized) cannot be assigned to a mental
limbo, there to play no serious role in the formation of our religious
awareness.15 For it does indeed affect this awareness; at the very least, for
example, in our sense of belonging somewhere secure in creation, under
the protection and loving care of God.16
More concretely (and perhaps more importantly) this thought affects
the relationship between science and religion. Under its influence
theologians could no longer so glibly condemn scientific effort as somehow
a-religious, nor its technological advances as something to be suspected.
For if we survive in the future to see the sun share the red glory that
Betelgeuse now manifests, it will only be because of the efforts and
success of science to take us elsewhere, off this planet Earth, to a new
home, a new Earth. The science that must somehow save us in the future
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should not now be scorned in the name of religion. For that sensitive love
of humankind which should mark them both, must ever deepen and
broaden, and join them together in common goals. For among many
other reasons, the one we have selected—the shining portent of
Betelgeuse now before our eyes—is certainly sufficient enough cause for
the effort.
The sad, weary statement is true: science and religion have for too long
been at loggerheads with each other. It has long been time to quit that
history of suspicion between them which has muddied so many lustral
human minds: Bruno, Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin.17 Instead, the cause
between them must become a mutually dependent one: the completion of
creation, sustained and sanctioned by God, for the benefit and salvation
of God’s creature, man. And this cause must be engaged actively between
them, in their deliberate association with each other, not in that passive
manner which simply acknowledges the right of each to exist and
function, so long as each does so within its own autonomous sphere. For
on more than one issue—not just that of the Earth’s eventual dissolution,
but, for example, the more immediate issues being raised in the field of
bio-ethics—this autonomy must break down so that a common issue may
be engaged in just that fashion, commonly.
It should come as no surprise, however, that in this task we ought
honestly admit that religion (here principally, theologians) is obliged to
take the initiative. For religion has so often contradicted science, and
then been proved wrong, that science may well rest secure in the thought
of its own integrity and vindicated truthfulness. Religion must admit to its
impetuosity in given historical situations (no matter how noble its motives
might have been), and demonstrate a willingness to appropriate and
understand what science presents by way of fact ^/7^/presentiment. Only
then will religion be able to exist harmoniously with science, and when
necessary adjust forthrightly its views and interpretations of reality
according to the findings and anticipations of its now friendly partner.18
A Basis for Hope
Men must have hope; or they despair, becoming listless, indifferent,
and void of meaning. Yet this hope must have some solid basis; otherwise
it is ephemeral, wraith-like, and eventually disappears. Yet it is never
enough merely to state what the basis of hope might be. Rather, the basis
must be supportable; that is, it must be justified in a manner outside its
own dynamic, on grounds other than itself. For why should men hope?
Surely not for the sake of hope itself; any argument based on this reason
must always remain unconvincing because of its circularity. What is there
in hope that presents it as a viable alternative to despair; the foundation
upon which it lives; the facts about it by which it is justified?
Much of modern theology may be described as a search to discern this
basis of hope. Some theologians, starting with Schweitzer and Weiss on
through Bultmann and Pannenberg, have sought it in the facts
(particularly the resurrection) surrounding the historical Jesus. With
different biases and different methods, however, each has quite naturally
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arrived at different conclusions. Each, however, has at least been true to
the idea that hope is not self-justifying, but must be justified by something
other than itself: in this case, the objective-historical nature of given
events recorded about Jesus in the New Testament. Whether or not there
are such ascertainable events in the New Testament, and if so which ones,
is, of course, still a matter of engaging (and often enraging) controvesy.19
But the controversy, while interesting and undoubtedly integral to
Christianity’s understanding of its sources, is not here of primary
importance. What is of primary importance, rather, is the recognition
that hope cannot ground itself.
Should we for but a moment, however, turn from the past to the future
in our search for facts upon which to base our hope, then one of these may
well be the shining image of Betelgeuse before us: the fact now known of
what our sun will become, and the hope this creates that we will somehow
survive its giant fury. And should we ask what justifies this hope, we need
only look to our scriptures, where it says that man is responsible for his
life and what becomes of him, and to our laboratories, where science
advances our knowledge and continually provides us with once unheard
of possibilities.
Betelgeuse shines. It is a ruby to our eyes, and its beauty worth our
homage. But the beauty is frightening, and the homage always fearful.
For the ruby prophecies the hell our sun will someday be. Together we
must face this fact, let it affect our thoughts, and with the responsibility
given us in scripture and the powers given us in science, create our future.
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By Thomas R. Frazier
Changing Perspectives in the Study of
Afro-American Religion
The church has been the central institution of the Afro-American
community. Black people are incorrigibly religious. Religion is the opiate
of the black masses. The black church is but a pale reflection of white
Christianity. The black preacher is a protean hustler preying on the
credulity of his congregation. The list of cliches is too long to recite in its
entirety; so let me just conclude with a couple of quotations from Elmer
T. Clark, an authoritative scholar of American religion:
Evangelistic work among the Negroes [in the antebellum years] was beset with many
discouragements owing to the illiteracy, the superstition, and the general backward¬
ness of the slaves. Fresh from the most degraded barbarism, these people were with
difficulty made to understand the fundamentals of Christianity. Wildly emotional, their
religious services were prone to become mere orgies of unrestrained frenzy. The
Negroes did not always connect religion with morality; but they were—and are
today—“incurably religious.”1
But the white missionaries persisted and overcame these difficulties.
As the author goes on to say: “The fact is beyond dispute, that the system
of slavery took the Negro from the rankest paganism and inured him to
the ways of Christian civilization, and the slaves and their descendants are
the best specimen of the African race ever developed in the whole course
of history.”2
I realize that it is a little unfair to begin a paper of this sort with a
quotation from a book published in 1924, but the fact remains that until
the last fifteen years, much of the conventional wisdom as well as the
scholarly research differed from this quotation more in tone than in
substance. And lest Clark be accused of malice toward his colored
brethren, he assures us, believe it or not: “The Christian white man of the
South is the Negro’s best friend, and has always been.”3 What was that I
said about no more cliches?
In this paper I want to suggest some ways in which we can better
understand the history of the study of Afro-American religion. Let me
make one thing perfectly clear at the outset. This is not intended to be a
study of Black religion; it is a study of studies. It is an analysis of published
material in the field. To the extent that black religion is occult, as Henry
Mitchell and others have insisted, I certainly lay no claim to special
knowledge.4 When material is published, however, I assert my right to
analyze that material to the extent of my insight and imagination.
The framework for this paper is drawn from an earlier study, and the
*Dr. Frazier is Professor, Department of History, Baruch College, City University of
New York.
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first part of my presentation will briefly summarize the material found
there.5 The last ten years has seen a veritable camp meeting established in
the field. Mass conversions of scholars, black and white, but particularly
black, have occurred. Those already at work found the need to rededicate
their lives, giving up the old ways and pursuing their new visions down
unaccustomed and largely untraveled paths. The second part of my paper
will suggest some of the reasons for his great awakening. Most of these are
obvious and will require only a brief mention.
The final portion of my presentation will provide illustrations from
recent studies which exemplify the changed perspective of the last
decade. This may require some modification of the categories outlined in
the first part.
In my previous work I attempted to discover the methodological and
intellectual presuppositions which tended to control and, I would argue,
in many cases distort the results of the research into the nature of
Afro-American religion. Without excessive manipulation, the material
seemed to fall into four categories. In my study I called these categories:
1) acculturation, 2) assimilation, 3) functionalism, and 4) racial pluralism.
Acculturation refers to the gradual adoption of the religious culture of
white Americans by black Americans. It is concerned with African
survivals in the religious life of Afro-Americans. It assumes that there is a
spectrum running from the “barbarism” referred to by Clark to “normal”
Protestantism and is interested in locating the point on that spectrum at
which the religious group under consideration is to be found.
Assimilation takes the point of view that the black person is completely
American culturally (whatever that means), and that his religion is to be
studied simply as a variety of American Protestantism. It should be
pointed out, however, that when the word assimilation is used in the
context of black-white relations, cultural assimilation alone is usually
meant, and a separation between the races based on color alone must be
assumed.
The category of functionalism is complex. It includes a necessary
distinction between what I call functional theory and functional analysis.
The first assumes the unity of the society and studies religion as a way of
maintaining that unity; the latter views the different roles religion might
play with regard to various sub-systems in the larger society. By far, the
largest number of studies fall into this category and almost all of these
deal with black religion as accommodative—that is, as being used by
blacks and whites to adjust the black person to his subordinate place in
American society.
The fourth category I call racial pluralism. By this I mean the study of
black religion as a method of helping black people develop a separate,
autonomous culture within American society. With one exception, the
studies in this category noted in my earlier study were published in the
1960s. It should already be apparent that in the last ten years this category
has expanded considerably. We will take specific note of this in the
concluding portion of the paper.
The above categories are in roughly chronological order and illustrate
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 53
the changing interests of scholars and the changing social climate. We
shall see later how well the categories hold up under the scholarly
onslaught of the last ten years.
At this point I would like to give examples of the material in each of the
categories in an attempt to show how the assumptions tend to control the
data and lead in certain cases to significant distortion.
Acculturation. One might expect to find Social Darwinist writings in
this category. And sure enough, there they are: In an article in The
Annals in 1913 which dealt with the subject “The Negro’s Progress in
Fifty Years,” and, more importantly, in a book published in 1905 by F. M.
Davenport, a sociologist at Hamilton College. This book’s title gives it
away: Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.6 The author makes his
position clear at the outset: “The doctrine of mental and social evolution
is assumed throughout. The world of living men is regarded as in process
of development from the animal and the primitive to the rational and the
spiritual.”7 As you can anticipate, there is no way Americans of African
ancestry can escape under this formula. And they don’t. Davenport is not
surprised. As he says:
... we would expect to find among the masses of the black people, as we do, many
clear marks of their inheritance. Dense ignorance and superstition, a vivid imagination,
volatile emotion, a weak will power, small sense of morality, are universally regarded
as the most prominent traits of the negro in those sections or the country, notably some
parts of the black belt, where he appears in his primitive simplicity.8
For Davenport it was the black person’s emotional nature which kept
him attracted to the church. This might be expected to change in the
future but, for the time being, “There has not yet been time enough for
more than a superimposition of higher elements upon their inherited
mental, social, and religious nature. . . . Civilization and savagery dwell
side by side in the same spirit, and the result is often flagrant contradiction
in thinking, in feeling, in conduct.”9 This kind of material could be used
today for comic relief, if it were not still so widely believed.
W. E. B. DuBois, on the other hand, was a pioneer in his studies of the
black church as he was in so many other areas. Although he became
personally disenchanted with the church while a student at Fisk, he
maintained his interest in the church as a social institution. As a matter of
fact he seemed to consider the church as a folk movement of black people
rather than a specifically Christian organization. For example, in 1903, he
wrote:
The Negro Church is the only social institution of the Negroes which started in the
African forest and survived slavery; under the leadership of priest or medicine man,
afterward of the Christian pastor, the Church preserved in itself the remnants of
African tribal life and became after emancipation the center of Negro social life. So that
today the Negro population of the United States is virtually divided into church
congregations which are the real units of race life.10
This notion of the universality of the black church as a folk institution is
akin to a theory developed recently by Nelsen, Yokley, and Nelsen. In
the introduction to their anthology of readings on the black church, they
suggest that it might be useful to see the church as “an involuntary (or at
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least semi-involuntary) communal organization that resembles the
phenomenon of the ‘state church.’ ”u
DuBois was interested in using the African background to provide
historical roots for Afro-American institutions where possible to lend
stability and autonomy to a people accused of cultural anomie by the
larger society. He believed that the black church could be studied as a
development with “gradual changes from the heathenism of the Gold
Coast to the institutional Negro church of Chicago.”12
Among early students of the more exotic elements in Afro-American
culture, one is enjoying a revival of sorts these days. Newbell N. Puckett’s
work on folk beliefs, published in 1926, while seriously flawed from both
racist and interpretative misconceptions, contains a wealth of empirical
data on black folk lore, secular and religious, which has contributed
significantly to recent work on black religion.13 In an article written the
same year, Puckett ironically prefigured some of the recent writings in
this category by indicating that cultural differences would prevent the
slaves from directly copying white Christianity: “. . . our concept of
Christianity is largely conditioned by our secular mores, and a people
with a background of tribal despotism, polygamy, witchcraft and such
would not easily be able to interpret the teachings of the Bible in the same
way we do.”14
Certainly the champion of the acculturationist scholars is Melville J.
Herskovits. His work in this area began in the 1920s and reached its
climax in 1941 with the publication of The Myth ofthe Negro Past, a work
done in conjunction with Gunnar Myrdal’s study.15
How does one deal with Herskovits briefly? All I will try to do here is
point out the significance of the African “myth” for Herskovits’ work in
Afro-American religion. The stated purpose of The Myth of The Negro
Past is to challenge that myth, which stated, among other things, that
Afro-Americans are a people without a past. Their culture was either
destroyed by whites or given up voluntarily by the Africans who were
brought to the New World.16 Herskovits is prepared to argue the
contrary. In fact the guiding principle of his work can be stated as follows:
Anything that can possibly be construed as an African survival is so
construed.
As is well known, most of Herskovits’ work elsewhere and in this book
dealt with African, Afro-Caribbean, and Latin American regions. His
method in this work seems to be: 1) analyze certain religious practices of
African tribes, 2) point out parallels in West Indian or Latin American
black religion. These New World (but not North American) cultures are
admittedly closer to the original African cultures than is the culture of the
American black. Then, 3) move suddenly into contemporary American
black religious life, where the African traits discussed in 1) and 2) above
are now discovered and described. Herskovits calls this method “tracing”
the African influences. He then quickly turns on his colleagues with: “As
manifestations of African religion are thus systematically traced, the
neglect of so many students to allow for the African past in the
explanations they offer of aberrant elements in negro religious behavior
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in the United States is seen to make a sorry chapter in the history of
scholarly procedure.”17
Even though I suggest in my comments above that Herskovits found
survivals where there were none, he also found survivals, and his attack
on his colleagues is well taken. Increasingly today, in ways which I will
indicate later, his admonition is being taken to heart, both within his own
discipline of anthropology and elsewhere. We are certainly in his debt for
a serious attempt to account for the positive elements of the African
cultural ancestry in Afro-American life. He turned the myth of the Negro
past on its head and continued the process begun by DuBois and others of
trying to make black Americans see that this African ancestry should be a
source of pride, not shame.
Assimilation. As used here, this point of view finds scholarly support in
Kenneth Stampp’s statement from the introduction to his book on the
institution of slavery: “I have assumed that the slaves were merely
ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes are, after all, only white
men with black skins, nothing more, nothing less.”18
The two leading scholars in this category are E. Franklin Frazier and
Joseph R. Washington, Jr. Although Washington keeps writing to say
that he didn’t really mean what people thought he meant in his last work,
his basic assimilationist position remains unchanged, as we will see later.
Frazier’s untimely death prevented him from writing a major work on
the black church. His slim volume, The Negro Church in America, was
based on lectures he gave at the University of Liverpool in 1953 and was
clearly intended to be a prolegomenon to a larger work.19 Therefore, it is
fragmentary and incomplete. But it is unlikely that Frazier’s basic
position would have changed.
One idea for which Frazier is widely known and which influences his
position on black religion is his opposition to the notion that elements of
African culture survived the experience of slavery. He forthrightly
opposed the acculturationist position described above. In his chapter on
the black church in his book The Negro in the UnitedStates, Frazier states:
From the scanty and fragmentary report on the religious behavior of the imported
Negro slaves, it would be difficult to establish any connections between African priests
and the preachers on the plantations. It would be even more difficult to establish any
relation between African religious practices and the Negro church which developed on
American soil. It appears from the historical evidence that the religion of the American
Negro and his church organization grew out of his experience on American soil.20
It is clear from all his work that Frazier is concerned with eliminating
any barriers which separate black Americans from full participation in the
larger society. He rejects the need for a racially separate society while
seeing the value of certain black institutions as transitional. He
recognizes, while lamenting, the necessity of certain institutions which
provide temporary relief from difficult circumstances. For example, he
says that: “Various cults and sects have sprung up in answer to the mental
and moral conflicts of the frustrated and disillusioned (urban)
migrants.” 21 But there is nothing racial about this condition, he would
insist.
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In his book on the black church, Frazier attempts some functional
analysis, but even in his description of the camp meetings, he strives for
an assimilationist perspective:
. . . The Baptist and Methodist preachers, who lacked the education of the ministers of
the Anglican Church, appealed to the poor and the ignorant and the outcast. In the
crowds that attended the revivals and camp meetings there were numbers of Negroes
who found in the fiery message of salvation a hope and a prospect of escape from their
earthly woes. Moreover, the emphasis which the preachers placed upon feeling as a
sign of conversion found a ready response in the slaves who were repressed in so many
ways. ... In the emotionalism of the camp meetings and revivals some social
solidarity, even if temporary, was achieved, and they were drawn into a union with
their fellow men.22
As Frazier develops his theory of the history of the black church in this
country, one can see emerging his hostile attitude toward this institution.
He feels that as long as the church holds sway over the lives of black
Americans, so long will they be denied access to full integration into
American society. This accounts for his widely quoted remark: “When
one comes to the Negro church, which is the most important cultural
institution created by Negroes, one encounters the most important
institutional barrier to integration and the assimilation of Negroes.”23
The provocative and controversial influence of Joseph R. Washington,
Jr. began with the publication of his book Black Religion in 1963.24 The
most important insight of that work was the division of the black religious
community into two groups: the folk religious community and the black
church. For Washington, black folk religion constitutes the fifth great
religion of the United States, the others being Protestantism, Roman
Catholicism, Judaism, and secularism. There is no place here for the
black “church.” So far as the black church is “church,” it has no
meaningful existence apart from the white church. It is this attitude which
causes Washington to be listed with the assimilationists. Black folk
religion, on the other hand, has a separate basis.
Negro folk religion is deeply involved in one area of Christianity, the ethic of
love—justice—equality, about which they have learned from people other than white
Protestants. The Negro folk religion is fundamentally.and unequivocally dedicated to
freedom, independence, and the rise of Negroes to equal status in the society. The
“genius” of the Negro folk religion is not the “church” but the use of this structure as an
instrument for the fulfillment of its participation as a race in every area of life.25
From this promising beginning, quite influential in the past decade,
Washington vitiates his insight by criticizing folk religion as theologically
inadequate: “Instead of the Christian faith, the principle of love keeps
black religion alive. This unfortunate fact is a deterrent to the full
participation of the Negro (as a whole people) in the mainstream of the
church universal and the American culture.”26
An unfortunate assumption which causes Washington to misunder¬
stand certain aspects of black religion is his idealization of the white
church as a theologically sophisticated institution. This leads him to
denigrate the black religious tradition unnecessarily:
Negro Christians certainly affirm with other Christians the Lordship of Jesus Christ,
but that this affirmation has little of the binding significance it holds for white Christians
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is indisputable; it is also prima facie evidence of theological poverty and the destitute
state of faith among Negro Christians.27
Almost every scholar who cites Washington approvingly on the folk
tradition points out that he has changed his mind later on the other points.
We will return to him in the conclusion and evaluate his present position.
Among the other assimilationist writings are three on the rural black
church in the South.28 The main import of these studies is that things are
difficult in the countryside but with effort, the black churches and
ministers can strive to reach the norms of the white rural churches of the
major denominations. To indicate the weakness of this approach, let me
note that one of these books, published in 1947, includes a survey of the
attitudes of rural black ministers on the quality of race relations in their
communities. Of the one hundred and five ministers who responded,
eighty-three said race relations were good, twenty-one said fair, and only
one said that they were bad.29 Perhaps there should have been a follow-up
interview with that last one.
Functionalism. The study of the role or “function” of religion in the
social system has become perhaps the most widespread frame of
reference for professional social scientists in this field. It is important to
distinguish clearly, however, the two aspects of functionalism: functional
theory and functional analysis. Thomas O’Dea explicates the former:
As a frame of reference for empirical research, functional theory sees society as an
ongoing equilibrium of social institutions which pattern human activity in terms of
shared norms, held to be legitimate and binding by the human participants themselves.
This complex of institutions, which as a whole constitutes the social system, is such that
each part (each institutional element) is interdependent with all the other parts, and
that changes in any part affect the others, and the condition of the system as a whole.30
But the study of the role religion plays in society need not assume a
functional theory about the society. In functional analysis the focus is on
the way religion operates to serve certain needs of the individual and the
society. Perhaps the most useful statement on this point comes from the
anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn: “A given bit of culture is ‘functional’
insofar as it defines a mode of response which is adaptive from the
standpoint of the society or adaptive and adjustive from the standpoint of
the individual.”31 Most of the studies to follow in this category use
Kluckhohn’s terms of analysis.
Before dealing with the studies using functional analysis, however, I
would like to pay brief attention to a work which attempted to evaluate its
material with functional theory. This otherwise valuable book is C. Eric
Lincoln’s study of the Nation of Islam.32 In the interpretive section of his
book, Lincoln tries to apply functional theory and the results are less than
successful. For example, he says:
A functional group is one that reinforces not the status quo, whatever that happens to
be, but the organic unity of the society. Segregation is a dysfunctional part of America’s
status quo, though our irresistible trend is toward integration. In siding with the disease
against the cure, the Muslims are profoundly and decisively dysfunctional both to the
Negro community and to the society as a whole.33
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Although Lincoln has earlier in this section of his book pointed out
several positive functions for the Muslims themselves, he seems overly
concerned for the society and vitiates his analysis by focusing on the
dysfunctions for society. He points out that Muslim behavior may cause
whites to increase racial barriers, that attacks on Christianity increase
social discord, and that “a deliberate policy of segregation is always
dysfunctional, regardless of its source.”34 Lincoln himself must have been
dissatisfied with this section of his book because he drops the entire
functionalism portion in the revised edition published in 1973 and
presents an entirely different interpretive framework in his new
introduction to that edition.
By far the largest number of studies of black religion fall into the
category of functional analysis. And almost all these view the primary
function of black religion as an accommodative device. According to
John Dollard:
Accommodation attitudes are those which enable the Negro to adjust and survive in the
caste situation as it is presented to him. Originally the alternatives to accommodation
were successful conflict with the whites or extinction. There was little prospect of
success in conflict, as the occasional slave revolts demonstrated. The desire to live was
strong, so that the only alternative was adjustment to the situation.35
With this attitude in mind, the dozens of accommodative studies can
only be hinted at here. The studies actually fall into three groups: 1)
General surveys of black life and religion, 2) Analysis of urban cults, and
3) Community studies of Southern towns. In the material to follow I will
list the major studies in each section and provide an example or two from
each group.
In the category of general surveys, we find the following: Mays and
Nicholson’s The Negro Church, Myrdal’s An American Dilemma,
Simpson and Yinger’s Racialand Cultural Minorities, and a little known
but excellent essay by Norval Glenn, “Negro Religion and Negro Status
in the United States.”36
The accommodative position in Mays and Nicholson is stated on page
one: “Possibly the most significant technique of survival developed
during the days of slavery might well be called a ‘religious technique,’
which is represented by the Negro spirituals and by the early efforts to
establish and develop the Negro church.” 37 According to the authors,
the church has its preeminent position in the black community because
black people had been largely excluded from the civic and institutional
life of the general American culture.38
Myrdal’s attitude toward the role of the black church in the community
can be stated as follows:
When discussing the Negro church as it is and as it might come to be, it must never be
forgotten that the Negro Church fundamentally is an expression of the Negro
community itself If the church has been otherworldly in outlook and indulged in
emotional ecstasy, it is primarily because the downtrodden common Negroes have
craved religious escape from poverty and other tribulations. If the preachers have been
timid and pussyfooting, it is because Negroes in general have condoned such a policy
and would have feared radical leaders . . . . When the Negro community changes, the
church also will change.39
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Indeed, Myrdal quotes a black Minister in a large southern city to this
effect: “ ‘We are the policemen of the Negroes. If we did not keep down
their ambitions and divert them into religion, there would be upheaval in
the South.’ ” 40
Using Kluckhohn’s terms, Simpson and Yinger list the functions of
black religion. These are: “self-expression, entertainment and recre¬
ation, adjustment to life crises, economic and otherworld compensations.
These functions have had adjustive value for individual Negroes and
adaptive (survival) value for the Negro group.” 41 In their analysis
Simpson and Yinger quote Mays and Nicholson extensively. Functional¬
ists often feed on each other’s work.
The work of the first group of functionalists can be summed up by the
following quotation from Glenn’s essay:
Many Negro religious beliefs and practices are, among other things, aids to adaptation
to a subordinate status. Although Negro religion serves many of the same social and
individual needs that are served by the religion of other people, it has in addition served
a number of needs that grew out of discrimination, prejudice, and the initially inferior
status of American Negroes.42
Well, by now you have the picture. The remainder of the studies in the
other functionalist categories apply the accommodative principle in
specific contexts. In the case of urban cults, the still standard work is by
A. H. Fauset.43 According to many observers of the urban scene, a
double accommodative function is at work there, adjusting the black
ghetto dweller both to the urban scene and to his subordinate but unstable
racial status. In describing the plight of the black immigrant to the cities,
Fauset indicates that
. . . one is led to believe that, for many of their members, certain religious cults in
northern urban communities assist the transplanted southern worshipper, accustomed
to the fixed racial mores and caste requirements of the South, to adjust his
psychological and emotional reactions to conditions in the North, where all life and
living are more fluid and intermingling of the races is inevitable.44
Other studies in this section apply this kind of analysis to the
movements of Father Divine, Daddy Grace, and a variety of holiness
groups.45
The last group of accommodative studies to be surveyed includes the
well-known studies of Southern black communities that were undertaken
in the 30s, 40s, and 50s by leading anthropologists, sociologists, and social
psychologists. Among these are the works by Charles S. Johnson, John
Dollard, Hortense Powdermaker, Hylan Lewis, and Allison Davis and
associates.46 Since all of these social scientists were engaged in field study
in the South during the period of thoroughgoing segregation, one is not
surprised to find them explicating the accommodative function of religion
for the blacks there. Perhaps a selection from Johnson’s work can stand as
an example of this group, all of whom found about what they expected to
find.
The religious emotions of the people demand some channel of formal expression, and
find it in the church. But more than this, the church is the most important center of
face-to-face relations. It is in a very real sense a social institution. It provides a large
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measure of the recreation and relaxation from the physical stress of life. It is the agency
looked to for aid when misfortune overtakes a person. It offers the medium for a
community feeling, singing together, eating together, praying together and indulging in
the formal expressions of fellowship. Above this it holds out a world of escape from the
hard experiences of life common to all. It is the agency which holds together the
sub-committees and families physically scattered over a wide area. It exercises some
influence over social relations, settings up certain regulations for behavior, passing
judgments which represent community opinion, censuring and penalizing improper
conduct by expulsion.47
According to all of the functionalist scholars, the church could only
provide the kind of service to the black community described by Johnson
if it adopted an accommodationist posture. One might well ask if this had
to be the case. But one can only ask; as far as the research indicates, this
was the case. Powdermaker asks this question and gives an answer which
includes an individual function which must not be overlooked or the value
of which must not be underestimated. Let this stand as the conclusion of
the section on functionalism:
In both its secular and its religious character, [the Negro Church] serves as an antidote,
a palliative, an escape. Not one of these functions is designed to deny or to change the
facts: each makes them easier to bear. By helping the Negro to endure the status quo,
this institution has been a conservative force, tending to relieve and counteract the
discontents that make for rebellion. At the same time the equally vital function of
maintaining the self respect of the Negro individual is by no means a conservative one.48
Racial Pluralism. A key to understanding the point of view I am here
calling racial pluralism can be found in a “Memorandum on the Study of
Acculturation” prepared by three leading anthropologists.49 There they
suggest that one of the results of acculturation is:
Reaction: where because of aggression, or because of the unforeseen results of the
acceptance of foreign traits, contra-acculturative movements arise; these maintaining
their psychological force (a) as compensations for an imposed or assumed inferiority,
or (b) through the prestige which a return to older pre-acculturative conditions may
bring to those participating in such a movement.50
An emphasis on contra-acculturation, then, can be said to be a mark of
the position of racial pluralism. We will expect to see a stress on racial
pride and the maintaining of racial identity. If acculturation means, in this
context, the adoption of the culture of the dominant society in the larger
social system, contra-acculturation refers to the deliberate attempt to
retain the older cultural heritage. In the case of Afro-American religion,
we would expect to see a stress on the racial ancestors of the blacks, that
is, Africa, or, perhaps, simply a maintenance of the separation which has
been forced upon blacks in American society but without the acceptance
of subordinate status.
As I indicated in my earlier remarks, this category was just beginning to
appear when I did the original study. The only significant earlier writing I
put into this category (and I wasn’t completely sure of my choice) was St.
Clair Drake and Horace Cayton’s study of blacks in Chicago.51 There are
clearly accommodationist motifs in this work, but the authors place an
overlay on the data (which is not always borne out by the data) that
suggests that they see the church as providing race leadership. They
indicate that their informants often judge the church solely on the basis of
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whether it is “advancing the race.” I believe Drake and Cayton see the
place of the black church as one of developing a separate and vital culture
that, on the one hand, accommodates its members to the realities of racial
living in America, but, on the other and more important hand, provides
blacks with a way of life that can enable them to live full lives without
participating in the institutions of the dominant white society which are
more readily available to them in a Northern city.
It is important to point out in this connection that all of the studies in
this section deal with religious life in Northern cities. And with the
exception of Drake and Cayton, are primarily concerned with
non-Christian cults. Here we will look at two studies of the Black Muslims
and one of Black Jews. It is clear in these cases that the contra-accul¬
turation referred to above is at work.
The first of the Muslim studies uses Anthony F. C. Wallace’s theory of
revitalization movements and applies it to the Nation of Islam. A
revitalization movement is defined by Laue as a “deliberate, organized,
conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying
culture.”52 Without going into the complex and detailed structure of a
revitalization movement, let me just suggest some of the applications of
the theory to the Muslim movement. Laue indicates, for example, that
the Muslims reject: “the white slave-master and his evil system, which
will be replaced by an all-black nation-within-a-nation—in which contact
with the white’s alien customs and values is neither desirable nor
possible.”53 The idea of a nation-within-a-nation is typical of racial
pluralism. The nation concept implies, if not equality of power, at least
equality of status. And the Muslims offer not only a new nationality, but a
completely new identity, including a new name, new life style, new
associations, new theology, and not least, a new heaven and a new earth.
The most valuable study of the Muslims we have is by a Nigerian
political scientist, E. U. Essien-Udom.54 He presents the Muslims as an
example of a black nationalist movement. Nationalism, for Essien-Udom
May be thought of as the belief of a group that it possesses, or ought to possess, a
country; that it shares, or ought to share, a common heritage of language, culture, and
religion, and that its heritage, way of life, and ethnic identity are distinct from those of
other groups. Nationalists believe that they ought to rule themselves and shape their
own destinies, and that they should therefore be in control of their social, economic,
and political institutions.55
Essien-Udom recognizes that “black” nationalism as he is using the
term, does not conform to this ideal-type definition. Most nationalism has
a territorial base, admits the author, but the black nationalists live in the
midst of an alien society with no real geographical region as its heritage.
The nationalism of the Black Muslims has caused them to place their
geographical antecedents in “Arabian civilization,” primarily located in
ancient Egypt. This movement is unusual also, as nationalisms go,
because it has not produced a specific geographical location for its future
home. It has, rather, placed its homeland in the eschatological future.56
The nation is a spiritual nation. And in this analysis it exemplifies racial
pluralism with a vengeance.
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The last study to be considered in this section of the paper is by Howard
Brotz and deals with a New York city cult called the Commandment
Keepers Congregation of the Living God, better known as the Black
Jews.57 For Brotz, the Black Jews represent an attempt by one group of
black Americans to develop themselves separately from the broader
institutions of the society. They will exist to themselves in as many ways as
they can. And, like the Muslims, they have built a myth on which to base
this separateness. As a result, Brotz points out, “In terms of this myth
they have a new conception of themselves as no longer despised pariahs
but rather as the chosen people, with a proud past and a triumphant
future.” 58
In the concluding portion of this paper we will see how the category of
racial pluralism has become the dominant analytical framework for
studies of black religion in the last decade. Before we get to the recent
studies, however, I want to suggest a variety of reasons for the well-nigh
revolutionary changes in the interpretation of black religion since 1967.
I can do no more here than mention some of the vast changes that have
taken place in the past fifteen years which have influenced the new work
on black religion. There are at least four areas in which these changes
have occurred: 1) in the society at large, 2) in the black community, 3) in
the black church, and 4) in the scholarly community.
In the society at large, of course, there seems to be a greater stress on
pluralism generally and a rejection of the idea that there is some general
cultural norm to which all Americans should strive to conform. There is a
greater toleration and a greater interest in cultural diversity, including
religious variety.
The changes in the black community are so far-reaching I will only
point out those which seem to bear directly on our subject. Among these
are the Civil Rights movement, the influence of separatist religious
leaders like Malcolm X and Albert Cleage, and the Black Studies
movement which explored in so many new ways the roots of black life and
culture in the United States. Particularly important for our purposes was
a growing interest in the history and culture of Africa and Afro-Caribbe-
an areas.
The changes in the black church itself have had a tremendous impact on
the study of black religion. Some of the most significant writing in this
field recently has been done by churchmen themselves, or scholars
actively involved in church life. The movement for a black church which
began in the 60’s and continues today, includes such groups as the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the National Conference of
Black Churchmen, and the black caucuses in major denominations which
are predominantly white. Black scholars influenced by the movement
have looked more deeply than before into the religious history of their
own traditions and found there ideas and experiences which help form the
framework for a new analysis. Not insignificant in this connection, and
something which will surely have increasing influence in the field, is the
black liberation theology developed by James Cone and others.
Finally there are changes in scholarship in the field of religious studies.
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Increasingly in studies of American religion, as is the case in American
history generally, the consensus view of the past is giving way to a
consideration of the variety of religious expression in American history.
Anthropologists, perhaps because they are no longer being funded by the
C.I.A., have turned their attention homeward and are increasingly
investigating both mainstream and marginal religious movements. More
and more, scholars of American religion are looking at the things that
differ in comparing religious movements rather than searching for
similarities. This attitude promises much in an attempt to understand
black religion in America.
Let us now take a look at the four categories of interpretation described
above and see how the new scholarship fits.
Acculturation. The definition of acculturation which was used in the
initial portion of this paper undergoes a slight alteration under the impact
of the new studies. No longer does the continuum run from “barbarism'’
to “normal” Protestantism. There is no more “normal” Protestantism,
but there is still a continuum. The recent work which deals with African
survivals is more interested in identifying the continuities and their place
in black religious life.
The boldest essays in this area are the two books by Henry Mitchell, a
black pastor turned theological professor.59 Both Black Preaching and
Black Beliefare concerned with exploring the differences between black
and white religious practices. For Mitchell, the differences are rooted in
the separate sources of religious tradition. “It is far more accurate,”
Mitchell states, “to speak of Blackamerican Christianity as a point on a
continuum beginning in Africa, than to speak of it as the direct
descendant of a tradition beginning in Athens or Rome, or, for that
matter, in England.”60 Shades of DuBois! The influence of the changing
attitude toward African culture can be seen in the following quotation,
directly influenced by the work of John Mbiti:61 “The African world view
was not recognized as such because it was so nearly identical with the
Judaeo-Christian view, and because it was automatically assumed that
religious views as high as this must have come from whites, not from
‘pagan' Africans.”62 Much of the empirical data in Mitchell’s work is quite
controversial but needn’t concern us here. What is important for our
purposes is that he sees the genius of black Christianity to be a result of its
African roots.
Another scholar influenced by Mbiti and others like him is Leonard
Barrett. In his work on the Africa heritage in New World religion,
Barrett, like Herskovits before him, deals primarily with Afro-Caribbean
and Latin American religions. The only major exception is a chapter on
the Garvey movement. But in his concluding pages he comments on
recent developments in the black church of North America. There he
places himself firmly in the acculturationist camp with overtones of racial
pluralism: “Contemporary Black theology . . . is rightfully understood as
primarily a reconstruction of the collective unconscious of African
peoples.”63 More empirically, he points out that the religious dimensions
of the Garvey movement are too often overlooked. He sees the UNIA as
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“a mixture of high-church, Baptist and African festivals.”64
The acculturationist perspective is also applied in two works on the
history of slavery, by John Blassingame and Gerald Mullin65—in an effort
to account for both resistance and rebellion.
An example of the new anthropology is found in Morton Marks’ study
of “Ritual Structures in Afro-American Music”66 published in the epic
collection of recent work in anthropology of religion edited by Zaretsky
and Leone. In that work Mark compares certain aspects of the Brazilian
carnival performance, New York Afro-Cuban music, and black gospel
singing in a successful search for Africanisms. We can expect to see more
and increasingly sophisticated comparative studies of this sort.
Assimilation: This is no longer an issue for scholars of black religion.
The only possible exception to this is in the latest work of Joseph
Washington, Jr. Washington is always difficult to pin down. While much
of his book on sects and cults provides an old-fashioned functional
analysis, the following apparently contradictory quotations illustrate the
difficulty with which one approaches Washington’s work:
Thus, what is African in black folk religion is not any unique religious phenomena,
doctrine, rituals, beliefs, or even the will to ethnic community or communalism. What
is African is simply the identity of a people who in common racial humiliation find
themselves and seek power to affect their lives. What is Christian is the demand for
communion with God in community with man. Black folk religion, then, combines the
suffering of African descent with the hope of Christian understanding in the quest for
power in the only way in which makes it a constant task—the black c«//worship of the
power of God for the power of the black men and thus all men.67
Assimilationist, right? But compare this with the following:
The special character of [black religion] is not its content but its intent, for the [religion]
is a synthesis of Western Christianity’s beliefs, practices, ceremonies, rituals, and
theologies with the African tradition of religion as permeating all dimensions of life,
without final distinction between the sacred and the secular. The intent of [black
religion] is that of traditional African religions—the seeking of the power or spirit of
God in all times, places, and things because without that power, man is powerless.68
O.K., you figure it out, as we move on to the next category.
Functionalism. Many of the studies of recent years contain elements of
functional analysis. But this dimension is played down as new emphases
have emerged. Although we can expect functionalist studies to continue
to appear, we can also expect that they will broaden their analysis to
include more than the dominant accommodative perspective of the past.
For an example of the new type, see the study of black Jehovah’s
Witnesses by Lee R. Cooper in the Zaretsky and Leone collection.69
Racialpluralism. I have already indicated that this is the direction in
which studies of black religion are going. The reasons for this are obvious.
Vincent Harding sounds the keynote for this development when he points
out that it has become necessary for blacks to make whites irrelevant in
the struggle to build the black community as a community of love. In this
connection he quotes Julius Lester to the effect that: “At one time black
people desperately wanted to be American, to communicate with whites,
to live in the Beloved Community. Now that is irrelevant. They know that
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it can’t be until whites want it to be, and it is obvious now that whites don’t
want it.”70
Harding sees the church of black power in the following terms:
Not only does it begin to fill the need for personal commitment and a sense of
fellowship with other similarly committed black persons; it also embodies impressive
social concern, a call for ultimate justice, and a search to be present with the sufferers of
the society. Gladly identifying with the oppressed beyond national borders, this church
increasingly seeks to glorify at least that part of God which may reside in black folk.71
The most extensive survey of black religion yet published comes out of
this new emphasis on racial pluralism and black equality. Gayraud S.
Wilmore’s Black Religion and Black Radicalism is a history of
Afro-American religion from Africa to the 1970’s. It is clearly intended as
an attack on the assimilationist position. He states his thesis as follows:
An exceedingly elastic but tenacious thread binds together the contributive and
developmental factors of black religion in the United States as one distinctive social
phenomenon. It is the thread of what may be called, if properly defined, ‘Black
Radicalism.’ Black religion has always concerned itself with the fascination of an
incorrigibly religious people with the mystery of God, but it has been equally concerned
with the yearning of a despised and subjugated people with the freedom of
man—freedom from the religious, economic, social and political domination which
white men have exercised over Black men since the beginning of the African Slave
trade. It is this radical thrust of Black people for human liberation expressed in
theological terms and religious institutions which is the defining characteristic of black
unity and of Black religion in the United States, from the preacher-led slave revolts to
the Black Manifesto of James Forman and the 1970 ‘Black Declaration of
Independence’ of the National Committee of Black Churchmen.72
Wilmore’s work is an exciting, thorough, original, provocative and
controversial study. I recommend it without hesitation as a magisterial
effort for which we should all be grateful.
Earlier in my paper I pointed out that C. Eric Lincoln dropped the
functionalist portion of his book on the Nation of Islam in the revised
edition. His new introduction provides a useful methodology for
analyzing black religion from the perspective of racial pluralism. He now
calls the Muslims a “protest movement” and draws on the sociology of
conflict for his theoretical framework.73 While he still doesn’t seem to like
the Muslims much, at least now he is better able to understand and
analyze why they act like they do.
Empirical substantiation for the position of racial pluralism is provided
in a book misleadingly entitled Black Church in the Sixties by Hart and
Anne Nelsen. Their survey data “emphasizes the importance of the black
church as a base for building a sense of ethnic identity and a community of
interest among its members.”74 Their conclusions are drawn from an
analysis of Gallup Poll data on church attendance and attitudes toward
the church’s speaking out on racial issues and of ministers getting
involved in racial or political protest movements.
In concluding this consideration of studies of black religion, I would
like to call attention to the work of a thoroughly secular historian of
slavery. In my opinion, the section on religion in Eugene Genovese’s
Roll, Jordan, Roll'xs the most original contribution of the overall work,
and the most satisfactory treatment of the religion of the slaves we have
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available. Since I am dealing with this material elsewhere suffice it to say
here that in developing his crucial notion of the cultural autonomy
created for themselves by the slaves in ante-bellum America, Genovese
argues that religion played the dominant role in that process. One
example:
The social significance of voodoo and conjure among the slaves lay less in some direct
threat to the whites, much less in their alleged use by whites to control blacks, than in
the degree of autonomy they provided the quarters. The slaves saw other slaves with
great power, and by that belief alone they offered resistance to that doctrine of black
impotence which the slaveholders worked incessantly to fasten on them.75
Speaking of voodoo and conjure, I would like to close this essay by
quoting a poem by Ishmael Reed, a black writer who has developed what
he calls a “neo-hoodoo aesthetic” out of which he has written such occult
novels as Mumbo-Jumbo and Flight to Canada.
SERMONETTE
a poet was busted by a topless judge
his friends went to morristwn nj & put
black powder on his honah’s doorstop
black powder into his honah’s car
black powder on his honah’s briefs
tiny dolls into his honah’s mind
by nightfall his honah could a go go no mo
his dog went crazy & ran into a crocodile
his widow fell from a wall &
hanged herself
his daughter was run over by a black man
cming home for the wakes the two boys
skidded into mourning
all the next of kin’s teeth fell out
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